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Black: The Public School: Beyond the Fringes of Public Forum Analysis
1991]
THE PUBLIC SCHOOL: BEYOND THE FRINGES OF PUBLIC
FORUM ANALYSIS?
I.

INTRODUCTION

The freedom of expression protected by the first amendment' is
"the Constitution's most majestic guarantee."'2 Although freedom of
expression serves many values in American society,3 one vital purpose
of this first amendment guarantee is to ensure that the "marketplace of
ideas" remains uninhibited. 4 Consequently, attempts by the govern1. The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
"Congress shall make no law ...abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. See L.
1988).

TRIBE, AMERICAN

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-1, at 785 (2d ed.

3. For example, Meiklejohn and Bork have posited that free speech is the
essential element in the successful operation of a system of self-government. See
A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 27 (1960) ("The principle of the freedom of speech springs from the neces-

sities of the program of self-government."); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).' Emerson suggests four principle functions of the first amendment: (1) a method of attaining self-fulfillment, (2) a
means for discovering truth and advancing knowledge, (3) a method of assuring
society's participation in social and political decisions, and (4) a means of keeping stability and change in the proper balance in society. T. EMERSON, TOWARD
A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3-15 (1966); see also Comment,
Abridgments of Free Speech Which Discriminateon the Basis of Viewpoint: Finzer v. Barry,
61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 127, i27 n.l. (1986). Emerson's second function of the
first amendment, a means for discovering truth, is sometimes described as the
marketplace of ideas theory of freedom of speech. See van Geel, The Search for
Constitutional Limits on Governmental Authority to Inculcate Youth, 62 TEX. L. REV.
197, 250 n.257 (1985). For a general discussion of the competing theories of
the values served by the first amendment's guarantee of freedom of expression,
see M. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 9-86 (1984).
Redish maintains that "individual self-realization" is the only true value served
by "the constitutional guarantee of free speech." Id. at 11.
4. See Comment, supra note 3, at 127 & n.2; see also Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes,J, dissenting) ("[T]he ultimate good desired
is better reached by free trade in ideas ...the best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market .... That at
any rate is the theory of our Constitution."); Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986) ("[I]t is important to
protect the integrity of the marketplace of political ideas."); CBS, Inc. v. FCC,
453 U.S. 367, 395 (1981) ("It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve
an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail .. ");
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) ("debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open").
The "marketplace of ideas" theory of the first amendment is based upon the
premise that freedom of speech is necessary to assure that people have before
them the requisite information to form their own beliefs and opinions, van
Geel, supra note 3, at 250. Maintaining this free marketplace of ideas allows for
the advancement of knowledge and the discovery of truth, both of which are first

(831)
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ment to suppress the free flow of ideas offend the first amendment. 5
The Supreme Court has been particularly unwilling to tolerate restrictions on expression which permit or proscribe speech according to the
viewpoint advocated by the speaker. 6 Thus, when scrutiniiing first
amendment challenges to regulations which restrict expression on government property, the Court will assess, inter alia, whether the government is engaging in "viewpoint discrimination" by denying the
challenging individual or group access to the government property for
expressive purposes while at the same time allowing access to other sim7
ilarly situated individuals or groups.
amendment values identified by Professor Emerson. Id. For a discussion of the
principle functions served by the first amendment according to Professor Emerson, see supra note 3. For a critical analysis of the "marketplace of ideas" concept of the first amendment, see M. REDISH, supra note 3, at 45-48. Professor
Redish posits that "[the 'marketplace-of-ideas' concept.., has often been subjected to savage attack, and to a certain extent the attacks have been entirely
valid." Id. at 46 (footnote omitted).
5. See D. BOGEN, BULWARK OF LIBERTY: THE COURT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 4-5 (1984) ("The language of the First Amendment leads to the principle
that the government may not act for the purpose of suppressing ideas."); see also
Comment, supra note 3, at 128. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 785-86 (1978) ("Especially where . . . the legislature's suppression of
speech suggests an attempt to give one side of a debatable public question an
advantage in expressing its views to the people, the First Amendment is plainly
offended.") (footnote omitted); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92,
95 (1972) ("[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has
no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."). For a discussion of Mosley, see infra note 31.
6. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,
61-62 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[wle have never held that government
may allow discussion of a subject and then discriminate among viewpoints on
that particular topic"). Justice Brennan, in a dissenting opinion in Perry, also
stated that "[v]iewpoint discrimination is censorship in its purest form and government regulation that discriminates among viewpoints threatens the continued vitality of 'free speech.'" Id. at 62. See also City of Madison Joint School
Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 175-76
(1976) ("To permit one side of a debatable public question to have a monopoly
in expressing its views to the government is the antithesis of constitutional guarantees."). For a discussion of the role of viewpoint neutrality in analyzing regulations of expression under the first amendment, see infra notes 51 & 54 and
accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S.
788 (1985) (remanding for determination of whether government impermissibly
excluded particular charitable organizations from participating in charity drive
aimed at government employees because government disagreed with organizations' viewpoints); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) ("disturbing the
peace" and "obstructing public passages" statutes, which allowed conviction of
protester merely for peacefully expressing unpopular views, violate constitutional rights of free speech and assembly); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268
(1951) (city's denial of permit for use of public park byJehovah's Witnesses for
Bible talks, while granting permits to other political and religious groups for
similar purposes, deemed unconstitutional because denial based solely upon
city's disagreement with Jehovah's Witnesses or their views); Hague v. CIO, 307
U.S. 496 (1939) (holding unconstitutional permit ordinances which allowed city
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To provide a framework to assess the constitutionality of restrictions placed upon expression on government-controlled property, the
Supreme Court introduced the public forum doctrine in Perry Education
Association v. Perry Local Educators'Association.8 Since 1983, the Court has
employed the public forum doctrine to analyze restrictions on expression in a variety or settings. 9 However, despite the seemingly broad application of public forum analysis, the doctrine has been criticized as
inadequate to resolve the issues presented in disputes over freedom of
expression on publicly owned property.1 0
The public school is one setting in which the public forum doctrine
officials to prevent respondents from holding public meetings and distributing
pamphlets solely on basis of respondents' affiliation with Communist viewpoint).
For a discussion of Cornelius, see infra note 53. For a discussion of Cox, see infra
notes 28-29 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Hague, see infra notes
23-25 and accompanying text.
8. 460 U.S. 37 (1983). For a detailed examination of Perry and the public
forum doctrine, see infra notes 36-54 and accompanying text.

9. For a discussion of the specific applications of forum analysis, see infra
notes 56-81 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473
U.S. 788, 833 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I am somewhat skeptical about
the value of this analytical approach [(i.e., forum analysis)] in the actual decisional process. At least in this case, I do not find the precise characterization of
the forum particularly helpful in reaching a decision." (citation omitted)); Estiverne v. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n, 863 F.2d 371, 377 (5th Cir. 1989) ("[W]e
believe that the first amendment issues presented here warrant a more detailed
discussion and should not be obscured behind a formulaic application of the
public forum doctrine."). The Estiverne court noted that "public forum analysis
becomes more difficult as it is applied to an increasingly broad panoply of government-sponsored communication." Id.
Commentators have also criticized the effectiveness of the public forum
doctrine. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 12-24, at 987 ("[Mjany recent cases
illustrate the blurriness, the occasional artificiality, and the frequent irrelevance,
of the categories within the public forum classification."); Cass, First Amendment
Access to Government Facilities, 65 VA. L. REV. 1287, 1308 (1979) (public forum
doctrine "calls for a single division between public forums and other places....

[But] the distinction on which this difference turns is not clearly formulated
....." (footnotes omitted)); Post, Between Governance and Management: The History
and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1715 (1987) ("The Court

has yet to articulate a defensible constitutional justification for its basic project
of dividing government property into distinct categories .... These rules have

proliferated to such an extent as to render the doctrine virtually impermeable to
common sense."); Werhan, The Supreme Court's PublicForum Doctrineand the Return
of Formalism, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 335, 341 (1986) (condemning doctrine as the
kind of formalism that "produces incoherent results untouched by the interplay
of considerations that should inform ...decision-making under the first amendment"); Leedes, Pigeonholes in the Public Forum, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 499, 522
(1986) (suggesting that categories established by the Court in the public forum
doctrine "may be too confining because first amendment freedoms need breathing space"); Note, PublicForum Analysis After Perry Education Association v. Perry
Local Educators' Association-A Conceptual Approach to Claims of First Amendment
Access to Publicly Owned Property, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 545 (1986) (positing
that the Court's attempt to clarify the public forum doctrine in Perry has "left
basic questions unanswered and lower courts confused" (footnote omitted)).
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is particularly inadequate to address the range of interests involved
12
when restrictions on expression are imposed." In Searcey v. Harris,
which will be the central focus of this Note, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit employed forum analysis to scrutinize a
set of regulations drafted by the Atlanta School Board to control access
of outside speakers to the Board-created Career Day program.' 3 The
district court had previously examined the regulations and determined
that certain provisions of the regulations were designed to suppress the
viewpoint of a peace group seeking access to the school-sponsored Ca14
reer Day program and therefore, did not pass constitutional muster.
After first concurring with the district court that Career Day constituted
a nonpublic forum, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
holdings regarding the regulations with slight modifications. 1 5 The
Eleventh Circuit found that some of the Board's regulations were unreasonable and viewpoint discriminatory because they prevented one
group, the Atlanta Peace Alliance (APA), from gaining access to the Ca16
reer Day events.
Part I of this Note outlines the development and current status of
the public forum doctrine, including the application of the doctrine to a
public school curricular setting. 17 Part II describes the factual background and the Eleventh Circuit's application of the public forum doc11. For a discussion of the particular inadequacies of the public forum doctrine as applied to the public school, see infra notes 132-81 and accompanying
text.
12. 888 F.2d 1314 (11 th Cir. 1989).
13. Id. at 1318-26. For a discussion of the Career Day regulations scrutinized by the district court and the Eleventh Circuit, see infra notes 106 & 108-19
and accompanying text.
14. Searcey v. Crim, 681 F. Supp. 821, 829-30 (N.D. Ga. 1988), aff'd as modified sub nom. Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314 (11th Cir. 1989). In an earlier
decision, the district court granted a preliminary injunction preventing the
Board from denying the peace group an opportunity substantially equal to that
afforded to military recruiters to participate in Career Day. Searcey v. Crim, 642
F. Supp. 313, 319 (N.D. Ga. 1986), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 815 F.2d 1389

(11 th Cir. 1987). The Board filed an interlocutory appeal, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded for further proceedings.
Searcey v. Crim, 815 F.2d 1389, 1395 (11 th Cir. 1987). On remand, the district
court considered the constitutionality of the Career Day regulations. 681 F.
Supp. 821 (N.D. Ga. 1988), aff'd as modified sub nom. Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d
1314 (11 th Cir. 1989). For a discussion of the Career Day regulations scrutinized by the district court, see infra notes 106 & 108-13 and accompanying text.
15. Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d at 1320, 1326. For a discussion of the decision by the Eleventh Circuit, see infra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
16. Id. at 1326. In its findings of fact, the district court described the Atlanta Peace Alliance (APA) as "a coalition of individuals and groups organized
for the purpose of providing high school students in Atlanta with information on
careers and educational opportunities related to peace as well as information to
help them make informed choices concerning military enlistment." Searcey v.
Crim, 681 F. Supp. at 823.
17. For a discussion of the history and current status of the public forum
doctrine, see infra notes 23-59 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
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trine in Searcey.1 8 Part III discusses the features of the public school
which warrant the application of a different standard in analyzing first
amendment claims arising out of a public school curricular setting. 19
Part III also proposes that the "reasonableness" standard employed in
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier20 is a more appropriate standard for
scrutinizing restrictions on expression in a public school. 2 1 This Note
concludes first that the Searcey court would have reached a different conclusion had it employed the Hazelwood standard and second, that Searcey
presented a prime opportunity for the Eleventh Circuit to respond to
the uniqueness of the public school as a first amendment forum, and
consequently, gave the Eleventh Circuit the opportunity to remove the
22
public school from the strictures of the public forum doctrine.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

Development of the Public Forum Doctrine in the Supreme Court

Prior to the 1939 plurality opinion of Justice Roberts in Hague v.
CIO,23 the Supreme Court denied that any right of access to public
places existed for free speech purposes. 2 4 However, in Hague, Justice
Roberts penned what is now considered the forerunner of the public
forum doctrine:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and,
time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has,
from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities,
25
rights, and liberties of citizens.
public forum doctrine as applied to a public school curricular setting, see infra
notes 73-84 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the factual background and the district court's and
Eleventh Circuit's application of the public forum doctrine in Searcey, see infra
notes 86-119 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the features of the public school which warrant the
application of a different standard in analyzing first amendment claims in a public school curricular setting, see infra notes 158-81 and accompanying text.
20. 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
21. For a discussion of the reasonableness standard proposed in Hazelwood,
see infra notes 132-41 and accompanying text.

22. For a discussion of the application of the Hazelwood standard to the facts
presented in Searcey, see infra notes 182-97 and accompanying text.
23. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
24. See, e.g., Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 47 (1897) ("For the legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park is no more an infringement of the rights of a member of the public than
for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house.").
25. Hague, 307 U.S. at 515. Respondents in Hague were individuals and unincorporated labor associations who alleged that officials ofJersey City had, inter
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Although some Supreme Court Justices periodically used the
phrase "public forum" following Hague,2 6 the coining of the phrase
"public forum" for the purposes of first amendment analysis is traditionally attributed to Harry Kalven's classic 1965 article, The Concept of the
Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana. 27 In Cox, 2 8 the Court held that two Louisiana statutes, which gave "unfettered discretion" to local officials to
regulate even peaceful public demonstrations, were unconstitutional as
applied, and thus, reversed the defendant's conviction for violating
these statutes. 29 Using Cox as a springboard to propose a new approach
to the first amendment issues surrounding speech in public, places,
Kalven stated:
[I]n open democratic society the streets, the parks, and
alia, refused to issue the necessary permits to allow respondents to hold public
meetings and prevented respondents from distributing pamphlets while permitting others to distribute similar literature. Id. at 500-01. In both cases, petitioners were acting under the color of city ordinances in preventing respondents'

activities. Id. at 501. However, respondents alleged that the city officials prevented their activities solely on the ground that the respondents were Communists or Communist organizations, and therefore, the city's actions were
unconstitutional. Id. The Court upheld, with some modification, an injunction
issued by the lower court preventing city officials from "abridging or denying"
the respondents' right to meet and distribute literature. Id. at 516-18.
26. See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 796
(1961) (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 806 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
27. Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SuP. CT.
REV. 1. Tribe writes that Kalven's "seminal" essay aided the "safe delivery" of
the concept of "public forums." L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 12-24, at 986.

The Supreme Court's use of the phrase "public forum" prior to Kalven's
1965 article was "not in the context of a recognizable first amendment theory.
The Supreme Court of California, however, had used the phrase in a surprisingly contemporary sense as early as 1946" in Danskin v. San Diego Unified
School District, 28 Cal. 2d 536, 545-48, 171 P.2d 885, 890-91 (1946). Post,
supra note 10, at 1718 n.l I (citation omitted).

28. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
29. Id. at 545, 558. In Cox, the defendant, Cox, led a group of more than
2000 students in a peaceful assembly at the state capitol building and then led
the group in a march to the courthouse where the students sang, prayed and
listened to a speech delivered by Cox on a sidewalk across the street from the
courthouse. Id. at 539-42. The students had gathered at the courthouse to protest segregation, discrimination and the earlier arrest of fellow student protesters. Id. at 539. Cox was arrested the day after the march and was later
convicted of breaching the peace and obstructing public passages in violation of
two Louisiana statutes. Id. at 544, 553. In assessing the validity of Cox's conviction under the breach of the peace statute, the Court held that Louisiana could
not constitutionally punish the defendant for merely engaging in the type of

conduct which the record revealed. Id. at 545. In addition, the Court determined that the breach of the peace statute as interpreted by the Louisiana
Supreme Court was "unconstitutionally broad in scope." Id. Similarly, in overturning Cox's conviction for obstructing public passages, the Court held that the
local officials' possession of "unfettered discretion" in the application of the
public passage statute was an "unwarranted abridgement of [Cox's] freedom of

speech and assembly." Id. at 558.
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other public places are an important facility for public discussion and political process. They are in brief a public forum that
the citizen can commandeer; the generosity and empathy with
which such facilities are made available is an index of
30
freedom.
Not until 1972, however, did the concept of the public forum
31
emerge as a viable component of first amendment jurisprudence.
30. Kalven, supra note 27, at 11-12. For a consideration of the first amendment values served by access to the public forum, see Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 815-16 (1985) (Blackmun,J., dissenting); Cass, supra note 10, at 1309-16; Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public
Places, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 233, 239-45.
At least one commentator has posited that Kalven's choice of the phrase
"public forum" has created difficulty in this area of first amendment jurisprudence. Post, supra note 10, at 1719. Post maintains that Kalven's use of the term
"public forum" shifted the focus of a first amendment analysis to the categories of
public property and away from the relationship between the category of public
property and "the underlying constitutional value of public discussion." Id. According to Post, Kalven never intended for the concept of the "public forum" to
serve merely as a means of categorizing the type of government property. Id. at
1718-19.
31. L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 12-24, at 986. Tribe notes that between 1963
and 1972, the public forum doctrine "went through a troubled period of gestation." Id. First among the decisions cited by Tribe as contributing to the "gestation" of the public forum doctrine is Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229
(1963), in which the Court reversed a breach of the peace conviction where the
defendants were engaged in the orderly carrying of anti-segregation placards on
the state capitol grounds. L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 12-24, at 986 n.3. See Edwards, 372 U.S. at 238. In 1965, this decision was followed by Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536 (1965), a decision which Tribe describes as more "hesitant" than
Edwards. L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 12-24, at 986 n.3. In Cox, the Court reversed
the defendant's convictions for both breach of the peace and obstructing a public passageway by assembling near a courthouse, but speculated that it may be
constitutionally permissible for the government to close all streets and other
public facilities to parades and meetings. 379 U.S. at 545, 555-58.
Finally, Tribe describes Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147
(1969), as the case in which "the hesitant approach of Cox was replaced by the
more confident approach of Edwards." L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 12-24, at 986
n.3. Shuttlesworth relied upon the dictum ofJustice Roberts in Hague v. CIO, 307
U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939), to hold invalid an ordinance which required a permit to
"participate in any 'parade or procession or other public demonstration' " in
public places. 394 U.S. at 152, 159. For a discussion ofJustice Roberts' plurality opinion in Hague, see supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
Among the "public forum" cases which led to the solidification of the public
forum doctrine during the 1970s, Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92 (1972), stands as the case in which the Supreme Court formally adopted
Kalven's phrase "public forum" as a term of art. Post, supra note 10, at 1724 &
n.41. In Mosley, the Court addressed the constitutionality of a city ordinance
which prohibited picketing within 150 feet of any school just before, just after or
while school was in session. 408 U.S. at 92-93. The ordinance contained a provision which exempted from the ban "peaceful picketing of any school involved
in a labor dispute." Id. Mosley, a postal worker, had frequently picketed Jones
Commercial High School in Chicago for several months prior to the enactment
of the ordinance. Id. at 93. Mosley usually picketed by himself during school
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During the 1970s and early 1980s, the Supreme Court increasingly emphasized and relied upon the characterization of publicly owned property for purposes of first amendment analysis. 3 2 During this period, the
characterization of some publicly owned property as "public forums"
necessarily meant that publicly owned property which did not fit into the
hours on the public sidewalk adjoining the high school, carrying a sign that read:
"Jones High School practices black discrimination. Jones High School has a
black quota." Id. The City of Chicago conceded that Mosley's picketing was
always "peaceful, orderly, and quiet." Id. After the picketing ordinance was
passed, police officials informed Mosley that he would be arrested if his picketing continued, and thus, Mosley ceased picketing the day before the ordinance
became effective. Id. Thereafter, Mosley brought suit, seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief from enforcement of the ordinance. Id. at 93-94. The Court
held that the city's ordinance discriminated among pickets based on the content
of their message, and thus denied equal protection to Mosley. Id. at 102.
Although the case was decided on equal protection grounds, the Court was
guided by first amendment principles and stated in often-quoted language,
"above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content." Id. at 95. Moreover, in officially introducing the phrase "public forum" as a term of art in first amendment jurisprudence, the Court stated that
"justifications for selective exclusions from a public forum must be carefully
scrutinized." Id. at 98-99.
While Mosley marked the Court's adoption of the phrase "public forum,"
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), marked the time "that
the Court first treated the phrase as a substantive term of limitation, using the
term to distinguish between different types of publicly owned property." Note,
A Unitary Approach to Claims of First Amendment Access to Publicly Owned Property, 35
STAN. L. REV. 121, 123 (1982); see also Post, supra note 10, at 1734 (Lehman repre-

sented the "first time the Justices gave the phrase serious and divisive doctrinal
attention."). In Lehman, the Court established that some publicly owned places
would not be considered classic public forums. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 302-03. In
determining whether a forum is public or not, and thus, in determining the degree of protection afforded the speech, the Lehman Court considered both "the
nature of the forum and the conflicting interests involved." Id. Consequently,
restrictions on expression in non-public forums are subject to a lower level of
scrutiny than the standards traditionally applied to classic public forums. See id.
at 303-04.
32. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1981) ("A university
differs in significant respects from public forums such as streets or parks or even
municipal theaters."); United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic
Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 133 (1981) ("While Congress ... may not by its own ipse
dixit destroy the 'public forum' status of streets and parks which have historically
been public forums, we think that ... a letterbox may not properly be analogized
to streets and parks."); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 655 (1981) (characterizing state fairgrounds as limited
public forum); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555
(1975) (municipal theater constitutes public forum); Lehman, 418 U.S. at 302-04
(characterizing advertising space on municipal transit cars as not public forum).
In addition, the Supreme Court has at times cited pre-1970 cases as though
they had turned on the characterization of the specific property involved under
the developing public forum doctrine. Note, supra note 31, at 123-124. See, e.g.,
Greenburgh Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. at 131 n.7 (citing Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496
(1939), as though Hague Court had applied term "public forum" to streets and
parks).
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"public forum" characterization would therefore be considered
nonforums.3 3 Under such a dichotomy, regulations restricting expression in nonforums were subjected to a lower level of judicial scrutiny
'3 4
than regulations restricting expression in "public forums."
After more than twenty years of uncertainty, the Supreme Court attempted a "comprehensive doctrinal synthesis" 3 5 of the public forum
doctrine in Pery Education Association v. Pery Local Educators' Association.3 6
Under a collective bargaining agreement with the Board of Education of
Perry Township schools, the Perry Education Association (PEA) served
as the exclusive bargaining representative for the school district's teachers and had exclusive access to the interschool mail system and the
teachers' school mailboxes. 3 7 No other union was allowed access to
either the interschool mail system or the teachers' mailboxes.3 8 The
Perry Local Educator's Association (PLEA), a rival teachers' union,
brought suit against both the PEA and individual members of the Board
of Education alleging that the denial of similar access to the interschool
mail system and the teachers' mailboxes violated PLEA's first and fourteenth amendment rights. 39
The Perry Court used this opportunity to set out three categories of
forums for first amendment purposes: (1) traditional, "quintessential
public forums," (2) "designated" or "limited public forums," and
(3) "nonpublic forums."' 40 The Court described "quintessential public
forums" as places such as public streets and parks, dedicated to assembly and debate "by long tradition or by government fiat."'4 1 In these
42
forums, the government may not prohibit all expressive activity.
Rather, in order to enforce any content-based restriction against communicative activity in a "quintessential public forum," the state must
show that the restriction is necessary to serve a compelling state interest
and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve its purpose. 43 The state may
also impose content-neutral time, place and manner restrictions in such
a forum if they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant interest, and if
33. See, e.g., Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. at 132 (letterbox is not public
forum); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (holding that military base,
although clearly publicly owned property, does not constitute public forum);
Lehman, 418 U.S. at 302-04 (determining that advertising spaces on municipal
transit cars are not first amendment forums).
34. Note, supra note 31, at 127.
35. L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 12-24, at 987.
36. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
37. Id. at 38-39.
38. Id. at 39.
39. Id. at 39, 41.
40. Id. at 45-46.
41. Id. at 45.
42. Id.
43. Id. (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)).
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adequate alternative channels of communication remain open. 44 "Designated" or "limited public forums" are places such as school facilities
or a municipal theaters which have been opened for use by the public
for expressive activity. 45 Once the government establishes a "limited
public forum," "it is bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional public forum" in its regulation of expression which falls within the
category of expression for which the forum has been designated. 4 6 The
Court defined "nonpublic forums" as "[plublic property which is not by
tradition or designation a forum for public communication." '4 7 In this
third category of fora, the primary consideration is preservation of the
property for its intended use.4 8 Therefore, access restrictions for "nonpublic forums" are subject to a lower level of scrutiny than those for
public forums, 49 and need only be reasonable5 ° and viewpoint-neutral.5 1
44. Id.
45. Id. at 45.
46. Id. at 46.
47. Id.

48. Id. ("In addition to time, place, and manner regulations, the State may
");
reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise ....
see Note, The Role of Viewpoint Neutrality in Nonpublic ForaAccess Restrictions: Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 851, 857

(1986) ("The primary consideration in a nonpublic forum is preservation of the

property for its intended use.").
49. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. In commenting on this reduced level of scrutiny
for the nonpublic forum, the Perry Court stated that the very concept of a nonpublic forum embodies "the right to make distinctions in access on the basis of
subject matter and speaker identity" which would be impermissible in a public

forum. Id. at 49. "The touchstone for evaluating these distinctions is whether
they are reasonable in light of the purpose which the forum at issue serves." Id.
50. Id. at 46. For further discussion of the "reasonableness" requirement
under Perry as applied to Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314 (11 th Cir. 1989), see
infra notes 182-86 and accompanying text.
51. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. Specifically, the Court stated that any effort to
regulate expressive conduct in a nonpublic forum must be reasonable and "not
an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the
speaker's view." Id. (citing United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh
Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 131 n.7 (1981)).
Under the strict scrutiny afforded to restrictions on expression in a public
forum, the government must establish that the restriction serves a compelling
state interest and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Id. at 45. However,
in a nonpublic forum, in addition to establishing that a restriction is viewpointneutral, the government must merely establish that a restriction is reasonable.
Id. at 45, 49. In fact, several Justices as well as numerous commentators have
suggested that a reasonableness standard is akin to no scrutiny at all. See, e.g.,
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 821
(1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (denigrating reasonableness standard applicable to nonpublic forum as "nothing more than a rational-basis requirement");
Werhan, supra note 10, at 410 (noting that the Court's use of the reasonableness
standard "is a signal that the Court finds no first amendment issue at stake").
Werhan contends that Justice White "went out of his way in Perry to emphasize
the laxity of the reasonableness standard governing speaker access to a
nonforum." Id. at 410 n.366 (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 53). This significantly
lower standard of scrutiny afforded to restrictions on expression in a nonpublic
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The Perry Court employed this three-forum framework and held
that the Perry Township school's internal mail system and the teachers'
mailboxes were nonpublic forums 5 2 and that the policy restricting access to the exclusive bargaining representative of the teachers was reasonable. 53 As to the requirement of viewpoint neutrality in a nonpublic
forum under Perry lends a "heightened significance" to the viewpoint neutrality
requirement within the context of a nonpublic forum. Note, supra note 48, at
860; see also Perry, 460 U.S. at 62 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (by focusing on the
characterization of the type of forum involved, "the Court disregards the independent First Amendment protection afforded by the prohibition against viewpoint
discrimination" (emphasis added)). Therefore, it is not unlikely that under the
framework proposed in Perry, analysis of restrictions on expression in a nonpublic forum could turn solely upon the viewpoint neutrality prong of the test.
This independent significance of viewpoint neutrality is not without precedent in first amendment jurisprudence of the Court. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785-86 (1978) ("Especially where ... the legislature's
suppression of speech suggests an attempt to give one side of a debatable public
question an advantage in expressing its views to the people, the First Amendment is plainly offended." (footnote omitted)); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169,
187-88 (1972) (state "may not restrict speech or association simply because it
finds the views expressed by any group to be abhorrent"); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 284 (1951) (holding that Jehovah's Witnesses, who were
denied access to public park to give Bible talks when members of other religious
organizations had been granted access to park for religious purposes, were subjected to improper denial of access due to public officials' disagreement with
their views).
Furthermore, the Court's longstanding concern with viewpoint discrimination is evidenced by an early line of cases which invalidated license requirements
for speech in public places when the issuing of the license was within the discretion of a government official. Note, supra note 48, at 859 n.49. Granting government officials such unfettered discretion is thought to create a great risk of a
viewpoint-based denial of first amendment rights. Id. For example, in Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969), the Court overturned a conviction under an ordinance which required parties seeking to parade or
demonstrate in Birmingham to obtain a permit from the city. Id. at 149, 159.
The ordinance either allowed city officials to dictate which streets or public ways
may be used for such parades or demonstrations or to refuse to issue a permit
entirely if the city deemed it was necessary for the "public welfare, peace, safety,
health, decency, good order, morals or convenience." Id. at 149.
The Court noted its disapproval of such broad licensing statutes in Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965):
It is clearly unconstitutional to enable a public official to determine
which expressions of view will be permitted and which will not or to
engage in invidious discrimination among persons or groups either by
use of a statute providing a system of broad discretionary licensing
power or, as in this case, the equivalent of such a system by selective
enforcement of an extremely broad prohibitory statute.
Id. at 557-58. For a discussion of Cox, see supra notes 28-29 and accompanying
text.
52. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. "The. school mail facilities at issue here fall within
this third category [(i.e., nonpublic forum)]." Id.
53. Id. at 50. The Court noted that "It]he differential access provided PEA
and PLEA is reasonable because it is wholly consistent with the District's legitimate interest in 'preserv[ing] the property ... for the use to which it is lawfully
dedicated.'" Id. at 50-51 (quoting United States Postal Serv. v. Council of
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forum, the Supreme Court dismissed the conclusion of the Seventh Circuit that the selective access policy constituted viewpoint discrimination
54
and consequently, upheld the selective access policy.

Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129-30 (1981)). Moreover, "the reasonableness of the limitations on PLEA's access to the school mail system is also
supported by the substantial alternative channels that remain open for unionteacher communication to take place." Id. at 53.
Two years after Perry, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the utility of its three
forum analysis framework in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund,
Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985). In Cornelius, the Court considered whether an Executive Order, which prevented charities such as the NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, Inc. from participating in the Combined Federal Campaign
(CFC or Campaign), was an unconstitutional restriction on access to the Campaign. Id. at 790. The CFC was an annual charitable fundraising drive conducted in the federal workplace through the voluntary efforts of federal
employees. Id. The Campaign was "designed to lessen the Government's burden in meeting human health and welfare needs by providing a convenient,
nondisruptive channel for federal employees to contribute to nonpartisan agencies that directly serve those needs." Id. at 795. The Executive Order limited
participation to "voluntary, charitable, health and welfare agencies that provide
or support direct health and welfare services to individuals or their families,"
and specifically excluded "[algencies that seek to influence the outcomes of elections or the determination of public policy through political activity or advocacy,
lobbying, or litigation on behalf of parties other than themselves." Id. (quoting
Exec. Order No. 12,404, 3 C.F.R. 151 (1984)). The NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, Inc., along with five other organizations, brought suit challenging their threatened exclusion under the Executive Order, arguing, inter alia,
that the denial of the right to participate in the CFC violated their first amendment right to solicit charitable contributions. Id. The district court determined
that the CFC was a "limited public forum," that the exclusion of the plaintiffs
was content-based and that, as the regulation was not narrowly drawn to further
a compelling government interest, it was unconstitutional. Id. at 796. The district court granted summary judgment to the charities, and on appeal, the judgment was affirmed by a divided court of appeals. Id. The Supreme Court held
that the charitable solicitation of funds is a form of protected speech and undertook an extensive forum analysis to scrutinize the constitutionality of the access
restrictions of the Executive Order. Id. at 799-813. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower courts and held that the exclusion of the charities was reasonable, and therefore, constitutional. Id. at 813. In reaching its
decision, the Court determined that the CFC was a nonpublic forum, therefore
restrictions limiting access to the forum could be made if such restrictions were
both reasonable and viewpoint-neutral. Id. at 804-06.
The Cornelius Court merely examined the reasonableness of the restrictions
imposed by the Executive Order, as the issue of viewpoint neutrality was not
before the Court. Id. at 809-13. The Court found that the access restrictions
were reasonable because they were designed to "minimize disruption to the federal workplace, to ensure the success of the fundraising effort, [and] to avoid the
appearance of political favoritism without regard to the viewpoint of the excluded groups." Id. at 813. In the course of scrutinizing the access restrictions
in Cornelius, the Court clarified the standard of reasonableness which would be
employed in scrutinizing access restrictions in nonpublic forums. Id. at 808.
The Court stated, "[t]he Government's decision to restrict access to a nonpublic
forum need only be reasonable; it need not be the most reasonable or the only
reasonable limitation." Id.
54. Perry, 460 U.S. at 49 & n.9, 55. In response to the contention of the
court of appeals that the mailbox access policy favored the viewpoint of the PEA
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Forum Analysis Doctrine in the Circuit Courts

Since Perry,55 the Court has had relatively little opportunity to apply
its forum analysis doctrine. 5 6 However, the courts of appeals have had
ample opportunity to interpret and apply the forum analysis doctrine to
a wide variety of fact patterns.5 7 Not surprisingly, many of these lower
(the exclusive bargaining representative for the Perry teachers), the Supreme
Court reasoned that "[tfhere is ... no indication that the School Board intended
to discourage one viewpoint and advance another." Id. at 49 (emphasis added).
Instead, the Court asserted, "[w]e believe it is more accurate to characterize the
access policy as based on the status of the respective unions rather than their
views." Id.
In dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Powell and Stevens,
argued extensively that the Court completely mischaracterized the issue in Perry
by resorting to a lengthy forum analysis rather than focusing on the viewpoint
discrimination aspect. Id. at 57, 62-64. Justice Brennan wrote, "[t]he critical
inquiry, therefore, is whether the Board's grant of exclusive access to the petitioner amounts to prohibited viewpoint discrimination." Id. at 63. Furthermore, by "[a]ddressing the question of viewpoint discrimination directly, free of
the Court's irrelevant public forum analysis, it is clear that the exclusive access
policy discriminates on the basis of viewpoint." Id. at 65.
One commentator, discussing the role of viewpoint neutrality, stated that
"[i]f there is one doctrinal rule that appears to have the universal approval of the
Justices, it is that the regulation of speech in a nonpublic forum must be 'viewpoint-neutral.' " Post, supra note 10, at 1824. Some commentators have adamantly joined in the Court's universal prohibition of viewpoint discrimination.
Id. at 1824 n.379. See, e.g., Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25
WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 229 (1983) ("[G]overnment can never justify a restriction on otherwise protected expression merely because it disagrees with the
speaker's views."); Stephan, The FirstAmendment and Content Discrimination,68 VA.
L. REV. 203, 233 (1982) (requirement of viewpoint neutrality "seems an essential concomitant of any rational system of freedom of expression").
55. 460 U.S. 37 (1983). For a discussion of Perry, see supra notes 33-54 and
accompanying text.
56. Recent cases in which the Court has relied upon Perry and employed
forum analysis in.analyzing restrictions on expression include, United States v.
Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3119-122 (1990) (employing forum analysis to scrutinize federal statute prohibiting solicitation and canvassing on premises of
United States Post Office); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790-803
(undertaking forum analysis to assess constitutionality of city ordinance requiring performers at city-owned bandshell to employ sound equipment and sound
technician provided by city), reh'g denied, 492 U.S. 937 (1989); Frisby v. Schultz,
487 U.S. 474, 479-88 (1988) (employing forum analysis to scrutinize first
amendment challenge to town ordinance prohibiting picketing in front of private residence); Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267-70
(1988) (forum analysis used to scrutinize decision of high school principal to
delete two pages of student-written articles from high school newspaper); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800-13 (1985)
(undertaking forum analysis to determine constitutionality of excluding particular charitable organizations from government fund drive). For a discussion of
Cornelius, see supra note 53. For a discussion of Hazelwood and its contribution to
the public forum doctrine, see infra notes 73-84 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., Barnard v. Chamberlain, 897 F.2d 1059, 1066 (10th Cir. 1990)
(bar association journal was nonpublic forum and bar association's refusal to
publish article written by member of Utah Bar did not constitute viewpoint discrimination); Planned Parenthood v. Clark County School Dist., 887 F.2d 935,
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court decisions have produced inconsistent results when employing the
58
forum analysis laid out in Perry.
946 (9th Cir. 1989) (high school publications are nonpublic forums and rejection of Planned Parenthood advertising from publications was reasonable), reh 'g
granted, 905 F.2d 1346 (1990); Student Gov't Ass'n v. Board of Trustees of the
Univ. of Mass., 868 F.2d 473, 476-77 (1st Cir. 1989) (legal services office does
not constitute forum for first amendment purposes); Alabama Student Party v.
Student Gov't Ass'n of the Univ. of Ala., 867 F.2d 1344, 1345 (11th Cir. 1989)
(concluding that Perry is not proper vehicle to analyze university regulations restricting distribution of student government campaign literature before and during elections); Estiverne v. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n, 863 F.2d 371, 383 (5th
Cir. 1989) (state bar association journal is nonpublic forum and first amendment
not violated by its refusal to publish attorney's reply to journal's report of disciplinary proceedings brought against him); Grattan v. Board of School Comm'rs,
805 F.2d 1160, 1162-63 (4th Cir. 1986) (public school parking lot is nonpublic
forum and school board is entitled to deny teachers' union representative access
to parking lot); M.N.C. of Hinesville, Inc. v. United States Dept. of Defense, 791
F.2d 1466, 1473 (11 th Cir. 1986) (military base is nonpublic forum); San Diego
Comm. Against Registration and the Draft v. Governing Bd. of the Grossmont
Union High School Dist., 790 F.2d 1471, 1476-78 (9th Cir. 1986) (school newspaper is limited public forum and restrictions preventing advertising in newspaper by anti-draft registration group are neither reasonable nor viewpointneutral); Calash v. City of Bridgeport, 788 F.2d 80, 83-84 (2d Cir. 1986) (municipal stadium is nonpublic forum and access restrictions imposed upon concert
promoter are reasonable); May v. Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corp., 787
F.2d 1105, 1113-14 (7th Cir. 1986) (analyzing applicability of forum analysis to
determine constitutionality of school administration preventing teacher from
holding teachers' prayer meeting on public school premises); Texas State
Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. School Dist., 777 F.2d 1046, 1050-53 (5th Cir.
1985) (employing forum analysis to determine constitutionality of school policy
restricting teachers' access to school property to discuss union matters during
school hours); Student Coalition for Peace v. Lower Merion School Dist. Bd. of
School Directors, 776 F.2d 431, 435-38 (3d Cir. 1985) (employing Perry analysis
in determining whether student peace organization has first amendment right to
use high school stadium for public antinuclear and peace exposition); Century
Fed., Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 710 F. Supp. 1559, 1571-74 (N.D. Cal. 1988)
(discussing forum analysis as one approach in analyzing claim of cable television
company that franchise fee restrictions on cable placement are first amendment
violations); Irish Subcomm. of the R.I. Heritage Comm'n v. Rhode Island Heritage Comm'n, 646 F. Supp. 347, 353, 359 (D.R.I. 1986) (Rhode Island Heritage
Day festival is public forum, and Rhode Island Heritage Commission's attempt
to exclude political groups from Heritage Day festival "must be condemned as a
naked prior restraint on speech in the public forum"); American Council of the
Blind v. Boorstin, 644 F. Supp. 811, 816 (D.D.C. 1986) (elimination of Playboy
magazine by Librarian of Congress from federal subsidy program for production
and distribution of braille edition constitutes forbidden viewpoint discrimination in nonpublic forum); Kurtz v. Baker, 630 F. Supp. 850, 857-59 (D.D.C.
1986) (forum analysis employed to scrutinize refusal of chaplain for House of
Representatives and Senate to allow nontheist to participate in guest chaplain
program), vacated, 829 F.2d 1133 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988).
58. For example, in Calash v. City of Bridgeport, 788 F.2d 80 (2d Cir.
1986), the Second Circuit considered the claim of a concert promoter seeking
access to a municipal stadium for a rock concert following the city's denial of
that access. Id. at 81. The Second Circuit agreed with the district court; the
municipal stadium was a nonpublic forum even though expressive activity had
been officially allowed there. Id. at 81, 83. The Calash court reached this conclu-
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Similarly, the scrutinizing of a restriction on expression for the
presence of viewpoint discrimination under the public forum doctrine
sion despite its description of the stadium as "a large, outdoor arena, located on
parkland adjacent to a public high school," and its finding that the municipality
allowed "civic, charitable and non-profit organizations" to use the stadium for
expressive fund-raising purposes such as a Beach Boys' concert. Id. at 81.
The Second Circuit's characterization of the municipal stadium as a nonpublic forum appears to contradict the three-forum rubric established in Perry
for forum analysis. See Century Fed., Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 710 F. Supp.
1559, 1571 n.18 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (The Calash court "reached a... questionable
result in finding that a municipal stadium was a category-three nonpublic forum.
.* This approach to forum analysis would seem to be in considerable tension
with cases . . .where the Supreme Court treated a municipal theater as a category-two designated public forum." (citations omitted)). Indeed, in defining
the public forum doctrine, the Perry court specifically included municipal theaters within the realm of "limited public forums." Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). Accord Cinevision Corp. v. City
of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560, 570 (9th Cir. 1984) (outdoor amphitheater is limited
public forum), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985). But see Rock Against Racism v.
Ward, 848 F.2d 367, 369 (2d Cir. 1988) (park bandshell is traditional public
forum), rev'd on other grounds, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
One commentator suggests, however, that a municipal stadium should not
always be characterized as a limited public forum. M. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS 241 (1983). Yudof writes that "where the government's mission is
to communicate and the scarcity of resources make editorial selectivity inevitable, the state need not tolerate or acquiesce in use of the forum that substantially
destroys the communication and editorial processes." Id.
Similarly, the Second Circuit in Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc.
v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority, 745 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1984), employed forum analysis to characterize the newsrack area in a commuter train
station. Id. at 772-73. The court attempted to follow the analysis established in
Perry, and found that this part of a public area should be deemed a nonpublic
forum. Id. The court reached this conclusion even though it determined that
this area of the train station was public, that it should be viewed as a forum
appropriate for newspaper racks, that newsracks had long been permitted and
that they had in fact been installed and used to distribute papers for many years.
Id. at 770-73.
Perhaps most illustrative of the difficulty faced by the lower courts in applying the public forum doctrine is ACORN v. City of Phoenix, 603 F. Supp. 869
(D. Ariz. 1985), aff'd, 798 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1986). In Phoenix, the court employed a Perry public forum analysis to validate the city's total ban on soliciting at
intersections. Id. at 871. The application of the public forum doctrine in Phoenix
is troubling because the court characterized the intersection of two streets as a
nonpublic forum despite specific language in Perry indicating that streets themselves constitute "quintessentialpublicforums." Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (emphasis added); see Phoenix, 603 F. Supp. at 871. In reaching this conclusion, the Phoenix
court necessarily reasoned that the confluence of two first category (public forum) properties constitutes a third category (nonpublic forum) property. See,
Note, supra note 10, at 552. The logic of the court suggests that "speakers in the
streets [must] be on guard not to approach intersections lest they be stripped of
their constitutional right to a forum." Id. at 552-53.
In fact, the Fifth Circuit expressly recognized the complexities of applying
forum analysis as prescribed in Perry: "[Plublic forum analysis becomes more
difficult as it is applied to an increasingly broad panoply of government-sponsored communication." Estiverne v. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n, 863 F.2d 371,
377 (5th Cir. 1989).
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has proven to be troublesome, even for the Supreme Court. 5 9 Prior to
Searcey, the Eleventh Circuit had an opportunity to clarify its approach to
scrutinizing restrictions on expression for evidence of viewpoint discrimination in a nonpublic forum in M.N.C. of Hinesville, Inc. v. United
States Department of Defense. 60 In M.N.C., a civilian publisher of a newspaper brought suit against the Department of Defense (DOD) seeking
equal access to information provided to a competitor by the DOD as
well as equal access to the competitor's points of distribution. 61 The
plaintiff, M.N.C., claimed that the Army's decision to award a publishing
contract to a competitor civilian newspaper and to afford the competitor
preferential access to an army base in order to distribute the newspapers
constituted a violation of M.N.C.'s first amendment rights. 62 After
agreeing with the district court that the military base was a nonpublic
forum, 63 the court pronounced two categories of content-based restric4
tions imposed in forums: viewpoint-based and viewpoint-neutral.6
59. For example, in Perry, the Court split five to four on whether preventing
the rival teachers' union from gaining access to the school's internal mail system
constituted viewpoint discrimination. Dienes, The Trashing of the Public Forum

Doctrine: Problems in First Amendment Analysis, 55 GEo.

WASH.

L.

REV.

109, 118

(1986); see Perry, 460 U.S. at 49, 56. Likewise, in Cornelius, the majority suggested

that the government's discrimination in favor of groups that utilize traditional
service-oriented approaches to aiding the poor and against those preferring advocacy may not constitute viewpoint bias. Dienes, supra, at 118; see Cornelius, 473
U.S. at 812-13. Justice Blackmun's dissent, however, found such distinctions to
constitute blatant viewpoint discrimination. Dienes, supra, at 118; see Cornelius,
473 U.S. at 833 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
60. 791 F.2d 1466 (11th Cir. 1986).
61. Id. at 1470.
62. Id. at 1470-71.
63. Id. at 1473.
64. Id. at 1474. The M.N.C. court explained that viewpoint-based restrictions are those which distinguish between the views of certain speakers, whereas
viewpoint-neutral restrictions are those that do not. Id. For example, Congress
could pass a law making it illegal to affix on a government building any object
not readily removeable. According to Tribe, such a restriction is content-neutral, and therefore, presumably constitutional. L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 12-3, at
798. Such a law would also be viewpoint-neutral because any object affixed to a
government building, regardless of the message which it conveyed, would be a
violation of the law. However, Congress could instead pass a law making it illegal to affix on a government building any object which expresses a political opinion, such as campaign posters. Such a law would be content-based as it is
directed only toward those objects which espouse political opinions, while still
permitting objects addressing other subjects to be affixed to the same building.
Such a law, however, would be viewpoint-neutral because no particular political
opinion is disfavored by the law. Finally, Congress could pass a law making it
illegal to affix on a government building any sign expressing opposition to the
President of the United States. This type of law would be both content-based
and viewpoint-based. Tribe notes that a law of this variety would presumably be
unconstitutional unless the government could establish that "the message triggering the regulation presents a 'clear and present danger' or is otherwise unprotected by the first amendment." Id.
However, some commentators have argued that even restrictions which are
content-neutral-and therefore viewpoint-neutral--on their face have "unequal
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Only viewpoint-neutral restrictions will be tolerated in a nonpublic forum. 65 The M.N.C. court then examined the procedures by which the
Army selected the competitor newspaper over M.N.C.'s in order to determine whether the procedures were viewpoint-based, and therefore,
invalid. 6 6 Ultimately, the court found no evidence that the Army had
discriminated based upon M.N.C.'s viewpoint. 6 7 After further determining that the access restrictions were reasonable in addition to being
viewpoint-neutral, the court affirmed the district court's decision and re68
fused to grant M.N.C. the requested injunctive relief.

The Eleventh Circuit emphasized the process by which the Army had
selected a base newspaper in its analysis of viewpoint neutrality. 69 The
court's discussion set the stage for its analysis of the viewpoint neutrality
of the Career Day regulations in Searcey v. Harris.70 Specifically, the
Eleventh Circuit in Searcey relied, in part, upon the strict requirement of
viewpoint neutrality to invalidate several School Board created restric71
tions on access to a high school Career Day program.
C.

Forum Analysis in the Public School: Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier

Although in 1983 the Court "codified" the public forum doctrine in
Perry, 72 it was not until five years later that the Court applied the doctrine to a public school in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier. 7s In Hazelwood, three former high school students, who were staff members of
the Hazelwood School District's student newspaper, alleged that school
effects on various types of messages." Stone, supra note 54, at 218 (1983) (quoting Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. Cm. L. REV.
20, 36 (1975)). For example, Stone notes that a content-neutral law which bans
all street demonstrations may have a disproportionate impact upon those who
rely upon street demonstrations to further their views. Stone, supra, at 218.
Most content-neutral restrictions, therefore, have at least some content-differential effects. Id. Such restrictions, although not as severe as content-based restrictions which substantially interfere with the communication of ideas and
viewpoints, nonetheless are analogous to "more modest viewpoint discrimination." Id.
65. M.N.C., 791 F.2d at 1475. The M.N.C. court cited Greer v. Spock, 424
U.S. 828 (1976), for the proposition that viewpoint-neutral restrictions will be
upheld in a nonpublic forum, whereas viewpoint-based restrictions will not be
upheld. Id. at 1474-75.
66. Id. at 1475.
67. Id. at 1475-76.
68. Id. at 1476-77.
69. Id. at 1475-76.
70. 888 F.2d 1314 (1 th Cir. 1989). For a discussion of the Searcey court's
analysis of the viewpoint neutrality of the Career Day regulations, see infra notes
117 & 120-28 and accompanying text.
71. Searcey, 888 F.2d at 1324-25.
72. 460 U.S. 37 (1983). For a discussion of the public forum doctrine as
delineated in Perry, see supra notes 35-54 and accompanying text.
73. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
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officials had violated their first amendment rights by deleting two pages
of articles from one issue of the newspaper.74 One of the deleted articles described three Hazelwood students' experiences with pregnancy,
while the other discussed the impact of divorce on students at the
75
school.
The district court concluded that the deletion of the two pages of
articles by school officials did not violate the students' first amendment
rights, because the decision to exclude the articles had a "substantial
and reasonable basis" and involved an "integral part of the school's educational function." '76 The Eighth Circuit applied the public forum doc74. Id. at 262. Students in the Journalism II class at Hazelwood High
School wrote and edited Spectrum, the high school newspaper. Id. The newspaper had a circulation of more than 4,500 copies and was distributed to students,
school personnel and members of the community. Id.
The standard procedure during the period in question was for the Journalism II instructor to submit page proofs of each Spectrum issue to the Principal
of Hazelwood High School for his review prior to publication of the newspaper.
Id. at 263. This procedure was followed for the Spectrum issue which contained

the deleted articles. Id. The Principal exercised his discretion to remove the

two articles from the newspaper during this review. Id.
75. Id. The Principal testified that although the pregnancy article used fictitious names, the identity of the students portrayed in the article could be determined from its text. Id. In addition, the Principal believed that references in the
articles to sexual activity and birth control were "inappropriate for some of the
younger students at the school." Id. Moreover, the divorce story quoted a student by name as saying that her father "wasn't spending enough time with my
mom, sister and I" prior to the divorce, that he "was always out of town on
business or out late playing cards with the guys," and that he "always argued
about everything" with her mother. Id. In deciding to delete this article, the
Principal felt that the student's parents should have been afforded an opportunity to review and respond to the student's remarks, or to consent to the publication of the article. Id. At the time the Principal decided to delete the divorce
article, he was unaware that the Journalism II instructor had deleted the student's name from the final version of the article. Id.
The two pages deleted from the newspaper also contained articles dealing
with teenage marriage, runaways and juvenile delinquents, as well as a general
article addressing teenage pregnancy. Id. at 264 n. 1. The Principal testified that
these articles were deleted solely because they appeared on the same pages as
the objectionable articles, not because he objected to their content. Id.
76. Id. at 264-65; see Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 607 F. Supp. 1450 (E.D. Mo.
1985). Specifically, the district court held that the Principal's concern with the
students' anonymity in the pregnancy article was "legitimate and reasonable,"
since Hazelwood High School contained so few pregnant students and the article itself disclosed sufficient additional details about the students to make their
identification possible. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 264. Moreover, the court determined that the Principal was justified in deleting the articles to shield younger
students from unsuitable material and "to avoid the impression that [the school]
endorses the sexual norms of the subjects" of the article. Id. at 265.

Similarly, the district court viewed the deletion of the divorce article as a

reasonable response to the Principal's concerns over the invasion of privacy of
the parents of the student named in the article. Id. Finally, the court concluded
that the Principal was justified in deleting the entire two pages of the newspaper,
rather than simply requiring the exclusion or modification of the teenage pregnancy and divorce articles, based upon his "reasonable belief" that time was of
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trine and reversed the district court, concluding that the censorship of
the articles by school officials was violative of the student journalists'
first amendment rights. 7 7 The Supreme Court disagreed with the
Eighth Circuit's characterization of the newspaper as a public forum,
finding instead that the newspaper constituted a nonpublic forum in
which "school officials were entitled to regulate the contents of the
Spectrum in any reasonable manner." 78 The Court stated that the regulation of student expression in a curricular forum, such as a student
newspaper, would be upheld provided such regulation is "reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." 7 9 Accordingly, the Court
reversed the decision of the Eighth Circuit and held that, because the
deletion of the articles was based upon reasonable and legitimate educathe essence, and consequently, there was no time to modify the articles in question. Id.
In reaching its conclusions, the district court did not employ forum analysis
as outlined by the Supreme Court in Perry, 460 U.S. 37 (1983), but rather invoked a "substantial and reasonable basis" standard as outlined in Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 264.
77. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 265-66; see Hazelwood v. Kohlmeier, 795 F.2d
1368 (8th Cir. 1986). Specifically, the Eighth Circuit determined that the newspaper was both a part of the school's curriculum and a public forum. Hazelwood,
484 U.S. at 265. The court concluded that the newspaper was a public forum
because it was "intended to be and operated as a conduit for student viewpoint." Id. Because the newspaper was a public forum, the Eighth Circuit concluded that school officials could not censor its contents unless such censorship
was needed to prevent "material and substantial interference with school work
or discipline." Id. Finding no evidence that the Principal could have reasonably
concluded that the deleted articles would result in substantial disruption in the
school, the court stated that school officials could only delete the articles if their
publication could have resulted in the school district facing tort liability for libel
or invasion of privacy. Id. at 265-66. Because neither the subjects of the articles
nor their families could have maintained such tort actions against the school, the
court held that the school officials had violated the first amendment rights of the
student journalists. Id. at 266.
78. Id. at 270. The Court found that the school district did not have the
requisite intent to turn the newspaper into a public forum, and therefore, the
newspaper constituted a nonpublic forum under the public forum analysis rubric
of Perry. Id. The Court noted that "the evidence relied upon by the Court of
Appeals in finding Spectrum to be a public forum [was] equivocal at best." Id. at
269 (citation omitted).
79. Id. at 273. The Court emphasized that this "reasonableness" standard
for educators "is consistent with our oft-expressed view that the education of the
Nation's youth is primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers, and state and
local officials, and not of federal judges." Id.
One commentator concludes that the reasonableness standard posited in
Hazelwood involves a two-stage analysis. Hafen, Hazelwood School District and
the Role of First Amendment Institutions, 1988 DUKE L.J. 685, 693 (1988). The first
stage of the analysis requires a determination of whether the student expression
at issue "occurs in a context that implicates the school's educational mission."
Id. If the first inquiry is answered in the affirmative, the second prong of the
analysis asks "whether the educator's decision has a rational-but not necessarily an explicitly educational-basis." Id.
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tional concerns, 80 school officials had not violated the student journalists' first amendment rights. 8 1
Hazelwood represents a noteworthy development in First Amendment jurisprudence as applied to public schools for several reasons. 82
First, Hazelwood created a new category of student speech-school-sponsored expressive activities-for purposes of first amendment analysis. 8 3
Moreover, the "reasonableness" standard posited in Hazelwood indicates
the extremely deferential posture of the Court to the decisions of educators and school officials when scrutinizing restrictions on expression in a
curricular setting under the public forum doctrine. 84 The Eleventh Circuit considered Searcey v. Harris8 5 against this backdrop of first amendment jurisprudence.
D.
1.

Searcey v. Harris

Facts

In 1973, a group called the Merit Employers Association began
working with the Atlanta Board of Education (the Board), planning activities designed to encourage students in the Atlanta Public School system to aspire to high goals. 8 6 Over time, these activities evolved into
two somewhat distinct programs: "Youth Motivation Day" and "Career
80. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 274-76.
81. Id. at 276.
82. In fact, one commentator has described the Hazelwood decision as

"probably the most significant free speech case involving public school students
since the Court decided Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District" in 1969. Hafen, supra note 79, at 685.
83. Id. at 685. Prior to Hazelwood, the Court generally relied upon the standard established in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), when evaluating the constitutionality of a school
official's regulation of student speech. Hafen, Developing Student Expression
Through Institutional Authority: Public Schools as Mediating Structures, 48 OHIo ST.

L.J. 663, 664 (1987). Under Tinker, a school official may only regulate student

speech when such regulation is "necessary to avoid material and substantial interference with school work or discipline." 393 U.S. at 511. The Hazelwood
Court specifically rejected the application of the Tinker standard to student
speech in a school-sponsored curricular setting. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270-71,
272-273.
84. Justice White, writing for the majority, employed the phrase "substantial deference" in describing the Court's posture in scrutinizing educators' decisions to regulate school-sponsored expressive activities. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at
273 n.7.
85. 888 F.2d 1314 (11 th Cir. 1989).

86. Searcey v. Crim, 681 F. Supp. 821, 824 (N.D. Ga. 1988), aff'd as modified
sub nom. Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314 (11 th Cir. 1989). The court noted that
92% of the students in the Atlanta public school system may be classified as
"minorities" and 85% may be classified as "poor." Id. at 823-24. Specifically,
the Merit Employers Association sought to "raise students' employment expectations, to encourage students to aspire to high goals in spite of racism, and to
assure students that opportunities for success do exist for them." Id. at 824.
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Day." 8 7 In January 1977, the Board adopted a general career education
policy which represented the only written policy relating to the Career
and Youth Motivation Days prior to March 9, 1987.88 The participants
in the programs, who were invited by the Merit Employers Association
or the school staff, were generally informed as to the general purpose of
the programs, but were given wide latitude in making their presentations. 8 9 Prior to October 1983, the Board did not exclude any individual or group from participating in the programs based upon the career
to be discussed. 90 In short, the Board exercised little or no discretion
over who would be allowed to participate, what written material would
be distributed or what topics would be discussed. 9 '
In addition to the annual Career Day, the school system's guidance
offices and guidance office bulletin boards provided career information
to students in the Atlanta Public Schools. 9 2 During the school year, guidance counselors met with students to discuss career and college-related
issues and distributed pertinent literature containing information about
careers and colleges to interested students. 93 Counselors also arranged
student meetings with college, career and military recruiters, and placed
94
printed college and career materials on designated bulletin boards.
On February 21, 1983, the Atlanta Peace Alliance (APA) sent a let87. Id. On "Youth Motivation Day," community members recruited by the
Merit Employers Association and school staff come into the schools to share
with the students their methods for overcoming obstacles in life and securing
responsible positions in business and industry. Id. On "Career Day," community members speak with students about more specific job opportunities and distribute printed career information. Id. The career education programs vary in
format, but generally begin with an all-school assembly and a keynote address,
followed by the students breaking into small groups and going to classrooms
where members of various career fields give presentations. Id.
88. Id. March 9, 1987 is the date on which the Board adopted a formal set
of regulations pertaining to the Career and Youth Motivation Days. Id. at 826.
"Thus, prior to March 9, 1987, the Board had no written policy concerning limitations on the types of groups or individuals who could participate in these programs or the topics that could be addressed." Id. at 824.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 825.
91. Id. at 824-25.
92. Id. at 825.
93. Id. This material was generally distributed at the individual discretion
of the guidance counselors. Id.
94. Id. In addition to scrutinizing the Career Day regulations, the district
court also considered the constitutionality of restrictions placed by the Board
upon access of the Atlanta Peace Alliance (APA) to school guidance offices and
guidance office bulletin boards. Id. at 828. Citing the longstanding practice of
the Atlanta public schools of holding the guidance offices and bulletin boards
"generally open to all groups and individuals that wish to offer students career,
education, scholarship or vocational information," the court concluded that any
attempt by the Atlanta School Board to apply their proposed access restrictions
to the guidance offices and guidance office bulletin boards would "run afoul of

the First Amendment." Id. at 828, 831. The School Board did not appeal the
district court's conclusion regarding the guidance offices and bulletin boards,
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ter to each of the principals of Atlanta's twenty two public schools requesting permission to place literature in guidance offices, set up a table
at Career Day, speak in forums where pro-military speakers were present
and to place paid advertisements in the school newspapers. 9 5 On April
4, 1983, the APA presented their proposal at a public meeting of the
Board,96 and on June 6, 1983, APA representatives met with Dr. Crim,
the Superintendent of Atlanta's public schools, to discuss the APA proposal.9 7 Following the June 6 meeting, Dr. Crim agreed to the APA's
proposal.9 8
Soon after Dr. Crim's decision to allow the APA to have access to
the schools, the Atlanta Journalpublished an editorial which labelled the
APA's views as propaganda and accused Dr. Crim of mixing career
counseling with "radical politics." 9 9 After the editorial appeared, the
Board reviewed Dr. Crim's decision and, following a private executive
session on October 4, 1983, announced the total suspension of the APA
from Atlanta's public schools.' 0 0 At that time, the Board also directed
Dr. Crim to develop a formal policy governing Career Day.' 0 '
As of April 1984, the Board had not adopted any policy regarding
the Career Day program and was still excluding the APA from the
schools. 10 2 The APA then filed suit alleging that the Board violated
their first amendment rights by *preventing them from participating in
Career Day or from placing literature in the schools.' 0 3 Prior to trial,
the Board adopted a uniform policy relating to Career Day. 10 4 By trial,
and consequently, the Eleventh Circuit did not consider these forums in its analysis. Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir. 1989).
95. Searcey v. Crim, 681 F. Supp. 821, 825 (N.D. Ga. 1988). Specifically,
the APA wished to place literature in the guidance offices which "concern[ed]
military recruiters, military life, draft counseling ...[and] set up tables promoting a career as a peace maker at Career Days." Id.
96. Id. No decision regarding the APA request was made at that meeting.

Id. In May 1983, however, the principals from two of Atlanta's 22 high schools
accepted the APA literature to be placed in the respective guidance offices. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. Specifically, Dr. Crim "agreed to distribute materials supplied by

the APA to guidance offices; to allow the APA to set up a table at Career Day; to
make a list of APA speakers available to the high schools; and to allow the APA
to place paid advertisements in the school year books." Id.
99. Id. The editorial was apparently sparked by a radio interview given by
Dr. Crim on July 15, 1983, during which he discussed his agreement to allow the
APA access to the schools. Id. The editorial was entitled Don't Peddle Propaganda
on School CareerDays and urged the Board members to exclude the APA from the

schools. Id. "The editorial caused quite a stir within the Board." Id.
100. Id. at 825.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 826.
103. Id. at 822-23, 826.
104. Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir. 1989). The policy
stated:
The Board believes that schools should provide educational programs
that are pertinent to the practical aspects of post-secondary life and to
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however, the Board had not adopted any administrative regulations to
interpret the policy. 105 When the district court deferred ruling until
regulations were adopted, the Board adopted Administrative Regulations to govern Career Day.' 0 6 These regulations provided the basis
upon which the district court and the Eleventh Circuit scrutinized the
constitutionality of the Board's exclusion of the APA from Career Day.
2.

Decisions of the Northern District of Georgia and of the Eleventh Circuit

The district judge, employing public forum analysis, determined
that Career Day was a nonpublic forum.10 7 Consequently, the district
the world of work. The Board therefore supports "Career Day" programs as part of the general curriculum programs for our schools. Career Day is to be a program which allows students to gain career
awareness and to explore career opportunities in various fields. Participants in "Career Day" programs shall have direct knowledge of the career opportunities about which they speak and shall be limited to
providing appropriate information about career fields. Participants
shall not be allowed to criticize or denigrate the career opportunities
provided by other participants. Written information about career opportunities may also be made available to students at school sites subject to the conditions imposed above. Restrictions may not be imposed
on the types of career opportunities in such material. The Superintendent shall prepare appropriate administrative regulations for the implementation of this policy.
Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. The district court "gave each party fifteen days after the adoption
of the regulations for comment." Id. at 1317 n.5. Three of the Career Day regulations invoked by the Board were pertinent in Searcey. Regulation Nine provided that presenters at Career Day must have some type of "direct knowledge"
of the career about which they will speak, in addition to having a "present affiliation or authority" with the career field. Id. at 1327. Regulation Ten required
that information concerning careers must be presented in a complete, objective
and "positive and encouraging manner," and excluded any presenter who primarily sought to "discourage a student's participation in a particular career"
from participation in Career Day. Id. at 1327-28. Regulation Eleven prevented
participants in Career Day from criticizing or denigrating career opportunities
offered by other Career Day participants and required that the information
presented to students encourage and motivate them toward positive career
goals. Id. at 1328. Additionally, Regulation Eleven, like Regulation Ten, excluded participants "whose primary focus or emphasis is to discourage students
from such career participation." Id.
107. Searcey v. Crim, 681 F. Supp. 821, 826-28 (N.D. Ga. 1988). The district court's primary focus in characterizing Career Day as a nonpublic forum
was whether the policy and practice of the Atlanta School Board demonstrated
an intent to create a public forum. Id. at 827. The plaintiffs sought to characterize Career Day as a public forum by establishing that Career Day included a wide
variety of groups and individuals who were afforded wide latitude in the content
and style of their presentations. Id. at 828. However, the district court noted
that the participants in Career Day were specifically invited and selected based
upon their perceived ability to serve as positive role models for students. Id.
Also, the court reasoned that, because Career Day was part of the required curriculum of the Atlanta Public Schools, labelling Career Day as a public forum
could have a disruptive effect upon the program and prevent a school from ac-
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court examined the content-based regulations to determine whether
they were reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.' 0 8 As a result of its public
forum analysis, the court enjoined the Board from enforcing the Career
Day regulations against the APA 10 9 to the extent that the regulations:
(1) prevented the APA from presenting information concerning peace
oriented education or career fields; (2) required the APA to have direct
knowledge of the opportunities about which they speak;"10 (3) prevented the APA from denigrating military careers;"' (4) forbade the
APA from primarily attempting to discourage students from participating in a particular field; 12 and (5) required the APA to have a present
affiliation with the career
fields about which they speak." s The Board
4
1
appeal."
an
then filed
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment with
slight modifications.'1 5 After agreeing with the district court that Career Day was a nonpublic forum, the Eleventh Circuit determined that
the requirement contained in Career Day Regulation Nine, that a
speaker at Career Day have "direct knowledge" of a career, was reasonable, and thus, reversed the district court's finding.1 6 With respect to
the remainder of Regulation Nine, however, the Eleventh Circuit found
complishing its curricular goals. Id. Finding that the Board has no intention of
creating a public forum, the court concluded that Career Day was a nonpublic
forum. Id.
108. Id. at 829-30.

109. Id. at 831.
110. Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1317, 1319 (11th Cir. 1989). Here, the
district court was referring to the language of Administrative Regulation Nine.
For an explanation of Regulation Nine, see supra note 106.
111. Id. Here, the district court was referring to the language of Administrative Regulation Eleven. For an explanation of Regulation Eleven, see supra
note 106.
112. Id. at 1318. Here, the district court was referring to the language of
Administrative Regulations Ten and Eleven. For an explanation of Regulations
Ten and Eleven, see supra note 106.
113. Id. Here, the district court was referring to the language of Administrative Regulation Nine. For an explanation of Regulation Nine, see supra note
106.
114. Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d at 1318. The district judge also scrutinized the restrictions placed by the Board upon the guidance offices and bulletin
boards. Searcey v. Crim, 681 F. Supp. 821, 831 (N.D. Ga. 1988). For a discussion of the district court's analysis of these restrictions, see supra note 94 and
accompanying text.
115. Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d at 1326.
116. Id. at 1322, 1326. The district court had determined that the "direct
knowledge" requirement was formulated specifically to suppress the APA's
point of view and was unreasonable. Searcey v. Crim, 681 F. Supp. at 829. In
reversing the district court, the Eleventh Circuit determined that a direct knowledge requirement is reasonably related to ensuring that speakers at Career Day
present reliable information and serve as positive role models to the students.
Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d at 1321. Moreover, the court of appeals noted that it
was reasonable for the Board to conclude that persons who lacked direct knowledge of a particular career field would not present appropriate information. Id.
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that the requirement that a speaker have a "present affiliation" with his
or her career was unreasonable and viewpoint discriminatory, and thus,
affirmed the district court's finding." 17 As for the "no discouragement"
requirement under Regulations Ten and Eleven, the court of appeals
affirmed the district court's finding of unreasonableness with only slight
modification.' 18a In effect, the Searcey court invalidated or clarified the

particular language in the regulations which had previously excluded the
APA from Career Day, thus allowing the APA to participate in the Career Day program. 19
3.

The Viewpoint Neutrality Requirement in the Circuit Court

One important element in the Eleventh Circuit's analysis of the Career Day regulations in Searcey was the requirement that such regulations
must be viewpoint-neutral in order to pass constitutional muster.1 20 Indeed, the Supreme Court specifically included the requirement of viewpoint neutrality for a nonpublic forum analysis in outlining its public
forum doctrine in Perry. 12 1 However, the School Board in Searcey maintained that, based on the Court's 1988 decision in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, school officials were no longer prohibited from
engaging in viewpoint-based discrimination."' 122 The Eleventh Circuit
disagreed with the Board's contention and examined the Career Day
123
regulations for evidence of viewpoint discrimination.
The Eleventh Circuit refuted the School Board's contention that
Hazelwood eliminates the requirement of viewpoint neutrality for restrictions on expression in a nonpublic curricular forum. 1 24 First, the court
that

117. Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d at 1321, 1326. The Eleventh Circuit stated
"[iut is not intuitively obvious that individuals who are no longer affiliated

with a career would have less information or would present a less effective role
model ....
Id. at 1321. Therefore, because the Board had not introduced any
evidence to support the reasonableness of the "present affiliation" requirement,
the court of appeals found that such a restriction was unreasonable. Id. at 1322.
118. Id. at 1322-24, 1326. Specifically, the district court had struck down
the "no discouragement" ban of Regulation Ten and the "no criticism, no denigration" ban of Regulation Eleven. Id. at 1326. Although the Eleventh Circuit
agreed with the district court's reasoning, it held that the "no discouragement"
and the "no criticism" requirements were reasonable "[t]o the extent that a
speaker is discouraging a student from entering a specific career by providing
students with valid and informative disadvantages of that career." Id. "On the
contrary, exhortative and denigrative presentations by speakers for the purpose
of denouncing certain careers for the purpose which they serve may properly be
banned." Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1319, 1324-25.
121. 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983). For a discussion of the Perry public forum
doctrine and the viewpoint neutrality requirement contained therein, see supra
notes 35-54 and accompanying text.
122. Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d at 1319, 1324-25.
123. Id. at 1324-25.
124. Id. at 1319.
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opined that the reasonableness standard employed in Hazelwood is no
different from the Perry standard for a nonpublic forum; "it is merely an
application of that standard to a curricular program."' 25 In addition,
the Searcey court reasoned that its earlier decision in Alabama Student Party
v. Student Government Association of the University of Alabama 126 specifically
directed that the Perry standard is applicable to situations where outsiders seek access to a school for expressive purposes. 12 7 Moreover, the
court posited that the Supreme Court did not consider the viewpoint
neutrality requirement in Hazelwood, and therefore, the Hazelwood decision merely acknowledged a school's ability to discriminate based on
content, not viewpoint. 128 Each of the arguments forwarded by the Searcey
court in support of the application of a viewpoint neutrality requirement
to the Career Day regulations will be considered below.
III.
A.

ANALYSIS

The CurricularForum: Reasonableness and Viewpoint Discrimination

In examining the Career Day regulations, the Eleventh Circuit accepted the district court's characterization of the Career and Youth Motivation Days as nonpublic forums for purposes of first amendment
125. Id. Although the Eleventh Circuit actually refers to the Cornelius standard in discussing the standard of review for nonpublic forums, the Court in
Cornelius merely quoted from Perry. Id. For a discussion of Cornelius, see supra
note 53. For a discussion of the Perry standard, see supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
126. 867 F.2d 1344 (11th Cir. 1989). In Alabama Student Party, university
students and an association of students interested in running for office in the
student government challenged campaign regulations adopted by the Student
Government Association. Id. at 1345. The regulations: (1) restricted the distribution of campaign literature to three days before the election and only in designated locations; (2) prohibited the distribution of campaign literature on
election day; and (3) limited public election debates to the week of the election.
Id. Although the district court employed a Perry forum analysis in assessing the
constitutionality of the campaign regulations, the Eleventh Circuit found Perry
not controlling and undertook a general reasonableness analysis of the campaign regulations. Id. at 1345-47. Acknowledging the deference afforded by
precedent to educators who are regulating expression with the intention of furthering the educational mission of a school, the court upheld the campaign regulations. Id. at 1347. In reaching its decision, the Eleventh Circuit noted that
"[tihere was no evidence that the regulations were anything but viewpoint-neutral," although the court did not indicate its reasoning for reaching this conclusion. Id.
127. Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d at 1319 n.7. The Alabama Student Party
court specifically stated that the Cornelius standard is the applicable standard
where outsiders seek access to a school. 867 F.2d 1344, 1345 (11 th Cir. 1989).
However, as applied to a nonpublic curricular forum as in Searcey, the Perry and
Cornelius standards are equivalent. For a discussion of the public forum doctrine
as outlined in Perry, see supra notes 35-54. For a discussion of the public forum
doctrine as applied in Cornelius, see supra note 53.
128. Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d at 1319 n.7.
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analysis.1 29 Consequently, the Searcey court stated that "the Board's Career Day policy and regulations will be upheld if they are reasonable in
light of the purposes of the forum and were not promulgated to suppress
the viewpoint of the APA.' 3 0° Indeed, the characterization and analysis of
Career Day as a nonpublic forum appears to be proper in light of the
principles established in Pery.13 1 Because a public school represents
publicly-owned property which serves a unique function in American society, restrictions on expression within the curricular "forum" of the
32
public school should not be subjected to standard forum analysis.'
129. Id,at 1318. The APA did not appeal the finding by the district court
that the Career and Youth Motivation Days were nonpublic forums, therefore,
the Eleventh Circuit did not revisit the issue. Id.
130. Id. at 1319 (emphasis added).
131. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
For a discussion of the characteristics of and the standard of review for a nonpublic forum as outlined in Perry, see supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
The Searcey court relied upon the district court's characterization of Career
Day as a nonpublic forum, without offering any independent reasoning for this
conclusion. Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d at 1318-19. The reasoning of the district court, however, is consistent with the guidelines established by the
Supreme Court in Pery. In Perry, the Court described a nonpublic forum as
"[plublic property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public
communication." 460 U.S. at 46. In Searcey, the district court determined that
Career Day was not by tradition accessible to the public, nor did the Atlanta
School Board intend to "designate" Career Day as anything but a nonpublic forum. Searcey v. Crim, 681 F. Supp. 821, 828 (N.D. Ga. 1988). Thus, Career Day
was properly designated as a nonpublic forum. For a discussion of the reasoning of the district court in characterizing Career Day as a nonpublic forum, see
supra note 107.
132. The special characteristics and unique functions of the public school
has been a persistent consideration in the Court's scrutiny of first amendment
claims arising within the public school. See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988); Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478
U.S. 675, 681-83 (1986); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 869 (1982).
For example, in Bethel, the Court considered the Section 1983 claim of a
high school student who was suspended from school after delivering a nominating speech at a school assembly which contained "elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor." Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675,
677-79 (1986). The student admitted that he deliberately used sexual innuendo
in the speech and was thereafter suspensed pursuant to a Bethel High School
disciplinary rule prohibiting the use of "obscene, profane language or gestures." Id. at 678. Following his suspension, the student brought suit against
the school district alleging a violation of his first amendment right to free
speech. Id. at 679. Despite the fact that the student's speech involved "highly
protected political expression," the Court held that the school district acted entirely within its authority in imposing sanctions upon the student in response to
his indecent speech. Hafen, supra note 79, at 691. See also, Bethel, 478 U.S. at
685. In so holding, the Court "painted the school's educational domain in
broad strokes ... to reaffirm the place of public schools in teaching basic values
within and beyond the classroom." Hafen, supra.note 79, at 691. Acknowledging this unique function of the public school, the Court posited:
The determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in
school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board.
The process of educating our youth for citizenship in public schools is
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Rather, in light of the deference evidenced by the Supreme Court in
Hazelwood to the decisions of educators in regulating expression in a curricular forum, and because of the special needs and objectives of the
public school curricular forum, the Searcey court should merely have examined the Career Day regulations to determine if they were "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." ' 3 3 Indeed, the School
Board in Searcey made exactly this argument.
not confined to books, the curriculum, and the civics class; schools
must teach by example the shared values of a civilized society.
Bethel, 478 U.S. at 683.
Similarly, in Board of Education v. Pico, the Court scrutinized an attempt by
a school board to remove library books, which members of the board found to
be "anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Sem[i]tic, and just plain filthy," from the
district's junior and senior high school libraries. 457 U.S. at 856-57. The
Board's attempt to remove the books was challenged by a group of students
from the affected schools, who brought a Section 1983 action alleging that the
Board's actions violated their first amendment rights. Id. at 856, 858-59. In a
plurality opinion, the Court declined to defer to the Board's decision to remove
the books from the library, stating that the Board's sweeping claim of discretion
"overlook[ed] the unique role of the school library" and the "regime of voluntary inquiry that there holds sway." Id. at 869. The plurality, however, acknowledging the special functions of the public school, concluded that the school
board "might well defend their claim of absolute discretion in matters of curriculum by reliance upon their duty to inculcate community values," id. (emphasis
added), and that the Board does possess unchallenged discretion in placing orders for library books, id. at 871, as well as "absolute discretion" in curricular
matters. Id. at 869. See also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) ("First Amendment rights, applied in light of the
special characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers and stu-

dents." (emphasis added)); San Diego Comm. Against Registration and the
Draft v. Governing Bd. of the Grossmont Union High School Dist., 790 F.2d
1471, 1484 (9th Cir. 1986) (Wallace, J., dissenting) (citing Tinker and noting
court's "obligation to apply first amendment fights 'in light of the special characteristics of the school environment' requires that we accept school policies
that are reasonably designed to adjust those rights to the needs of the school
environment" (citations omitted)); Student Coalition for Peace v. Lower Merion
School Dist. Bd. of School Directors, 776 F.2d 431, 437 (3d Cir. 1985) ("The
courts have never 'suggested that students, teachers, or anyone else has an absolute constitutional right to use all parts of a school building or its immediate
environs for his unlimited expressive purpose.' " (citation omitted)); Diamond,
The FirstAmendment and Public Schools: The Case AgainstJudicial Intervention, 59 TEx.

L. REV. 477, 497 (1981) ("Conventional first amendment analysis is inappropriate in the public school situation .... ); see generally, Dessem, Board of Curators
of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz: Academic Versus Judicial Expertise, 39
OHIO ST. L.J. 476 (1978) (discussing Supreme Court's view that academic decisions should be left to educators).
133. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). Certainly, the Perry standard employed by the Searcey court is well-established in first amendment jurisprudence.
However, the application of the Hazelwood standard is more appropriate in the
context of a public school, because it properly affords greater deference to the
curricular decisions of administrators and teachers by not requiring that all decisions be viewpoint-neutral. For a discussion of the Perry standard, see supra
notes 35-54 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Hazelwood and the "reasonableness" standard employed therein, see supra notes 72-84 and infra notes

138-52 and accompanying text.
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Hazelwood and the Elimination of the Requirement of Viewpoint
Neutrality in a CurricularForum

The Atlanta School Board recognized the special needs of the public school setting and the inadequacy of standard forum analysis in evaluating the Board's access policy on Career and Youth Motivation
Days. 134 The School Board argued that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Hazelwood "change[d] the First Amendment analysis applied to
school officials' decisions relating to curricular programs."' 3 5 Specifically, the Board asserted that, after Hazelwood, there is no requirement
that restrictions on speech in a public school curricular activity, such as
Career Day, must be viewpoint-neutral.' 5 6 The Board argued that the
only requirement is that any restriction on speech in a curricular activity
37
must simply be reasonable.'
In Hazelwood, the Supreme Court asserted that, because of the special role of schools in our society, school officials are permitted to regulate student expression in a curricular setting where such a regulation
would not be upheld in a nonschool setting. 13 8 The only specific requirements placed by the Hazelwood Court upon an administrator's regu134. See Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d at 1319.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1319 n.7, 1324. The Board's contention appears to be in direct
opposition to the standard of scrutiny for a nonpublic forum enunciated in Perry
and employed by both the district court and the Eleventh Circuit in analyzing
the Board's Career Day access restrictions. Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d at 1319;
Searcey v. Crim, 681 F. Supp. 821, 828 (N.D. Ga. 1988). Under a Perry analysis
of a nonpublic forum, any restrictions on expression seemingly must be both reasonable and viewpoint-neutral. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. This analysis, in fact, was
the standard employed by both the district court and the Eleventh Circuit in
analyzing the Career Day access restrictions in the instant case. See Searcey v.
Harris, 888 F.2d at 1319; Searcey v. Crim, 681 F. Supp. at 828. The mere reasonableness standard announced in Hazelwood, however, is not necessarily inconsistent with the Perry analytical framework for a nonpublic forum. For a
discussion of the interplay between the Perry and Hazelwood analyses, see infra
note 141.
The School Board essentially argued that the Hazelwood decision established
a new standard for scrutinizing restrictions on expression in a public school curricular setting. Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d at 1319. This new standard requires
only that restrictions on expression in a public school curricular forum be reasonable, essentially eliminating the requirement of viewpoint neutrality imposed
under Perry. Id.
137. Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d at 1319. The Hazelwood Court specifically
required that any restrictions on speech in a school-sponsored expressive activity be "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." Hazelwood, 484
U.S. at 273. For a discussion of the Hazelwood standard of scrutiny, see supra
notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
138. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271. The Court stated that educators have the
authority to exercise greater control over school-sponsored student expression
in order to accomplish the curricular objectives of the activity and to prevent
students from being exposed to material that may be inappropriate for their age
and maturity level. Id. Also, school officials are entitled to regulate student expression to assure that the views of the speaker are not improperly attributed to
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lation of expression in a curricular setting are that such restrictions must
be "reasonably related to pedagogical concerns" and must have a "valid
educational purpose."' 3 9 Moreover, according to the Hazelwood Court,
school administrators are to be afforded a great deal of deference in
their decisions to restrict expression in a school setting. 140
The Eleventh Circuit, however, dismissed the School Board's contention that the Hazelwood decision warranted the application of a mere
"reasonableness" standard to the Career Day regulations. 14 1 One of
the school and to dissociate the school from speech that is biased or prejudicial.
Id.
For a discussion of Hazelwood, see supra notes 72-84 and accompanying text.
139. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273. Noticeably absent from the Hazelwood standard for a curricular setting is any explicit requirement that the restrictions be
viewpoint-neutral. Indeed, viewpoint neutrality is one of the two essential elements for a restriction on expression in a nonpublic forum that must be satisfied
in order to pass constitutional muster under the Perry framework. 460 U.S. at
46. For a discussion of Perry, see supra notes 35-54 and accompanying text.
140. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273 & n.7. The Hazelwood Court addressed the
regulation of student speech in a curricular setting. In Searcey, however, the Eleventh Circuit considered a regulation of access of outsiders who sought to participate in a curricular forum within the school. 888 F.2d at 1316-17. However, it is
difficult-if not impossible-to argue that a public school administrator should
not have at least the same right to regulate the expression and the access of outsiders to a public school curricular activity as the Court affords an administrator
when regulating student expression within the same forum.
In delineating the standard of review for speech in a curricular setting, the
Hazelwood Court noted that "educators do not offend the First Amendment by
exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in
school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." 484 U.S. at 273 (emphasis added). The
Hazelwood Court's deferential posture toward the decision of educators is evidenced throughout the decision: "It is only when the decision to censor a
school-sponsored publication, theatrical production, or other vehicle of student
expression has no valid educational purpose that the First Amendment is so 'directly and sharply implicate[d],' as to require judicial intervention to protect students' constitutional rights." Id. (citation omitted).
The Court further stated that "the education of the Nation's youth is primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers, and state and local school officials,
and not of federal judges." Id.
141. Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d at 1319 & n.7. Specifically, the Searcey
court asserted that the reasonableness standard employed in Hazelwood is no different from the [Perry] standard for a nonpublic forum; "instead it is merely an
application of that standard to a curricular program." 888 F.2d at 1319. In fact,
the reasonableness standards employed in Perry and Hazelwood may be functionally equivalent when applied to a public school curricular forum. The School
Board's central contention, however, was that the Hazelwood decision rendered
the viewpoint neutrality branch of the Perry forum analysis inapplicable to a curricular forum. Id.
Additionally, the Searcey court reasoned that its earlier decision in Alabama
Student Party v. Student Government Association of the University of Alabama,
867 F.2d 1344 (11 th Cir. 1989), directed that the Perry standard-with its accompanying requirement of viewpoint neutrality-is applicable to situations where
outsiders seek access to a school for expressive purposes. 888 F.2d at 1319 n.7.
However, the language of Alabama Student Party referred to by the Searcey court in
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the principle reasons relied upon by the Eleventh Circuit in rejecting the
Board's contention is that the Hazelwood Court was not confronted with
any evidence of viewpoint discrimination, and therefore, the Hazelwood
decision merely afforded educators the right to make reasonable contentbased restrictions. 14 2 However, a close reading of the language of Hazelwood-considered in conjunction with the overriding interests of the
public school' 4 3-suggests that, in fact, the Court is prepared to allow
educators to invoke reasonable restrictions on expression which may also
44
be viewpoint-based.'
According to the Hazelwood Court, educators may regulate expression in a curricular forum "to assure that participants learn whatever
lessons the activity is designed to teach."' 14 5 Moreover, school officials
are permitted to exercise control over expression in a curricular forum
to prevent students from being exposed to material which may not be
appropriate for their intellectual and emotional maturity levels. 14 6 Fisupport of this proposition cites cases involving a university, not an elementary
or secondary school. Alabama Student Party, 867 F.2d at 1345 (citing Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972)). Additionally, Alabama Student Party itself involves a university forum, rather than an elementary or secondary school. Alabama Student Party, 867 F.2d at 1345. A critical
theme throughout the Hazelwood decision is the need for recognition of the
unique features of the public school when scrutinizing restrictions on expression
in a curricular forum. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271-72. A university does not possess the same features or fulfill the same mission as an elementary or secondary
school. Therefore, the standards employed in scrutinizing restrictions on expression in a university forum are not necessarily applicable when analyzing
such restrictions in a public school. In fact, the Hazelwood Court specifically
noted that it was not deciding "whether the same degree of deference is appropriate with respect to school-sponsored expressive activities at the college and
university level." Id. at 273 n.7. For a discussion of the unique features of the
public school which warrant a different standard of analysis, see infra notes 15881 and accompanying text.
142. Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d at 1319 n.7.
143. The Hazelwood Court labels these overriding interests as "legitimate
pedagogical concerns." 484 U.S. at 271-73. For a discussion of these "legitimate pedagogical concerns" as defined in Hazelwood, see infra notes 145-49 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the unique features and functions of the
public school which warrant the use of a mere "reasonableness" standard in
assessing restrictions on expression in a curricular forum, see infra notes 158-81
and accompanying text.
144. In fact, one commentator has asserted that not only is the Court prepared to accept viewpoint-based restrictions, but in fact "the Hazelwood decision
provides no limiting mechanism to restrain educators from censoring student
speech." Note, A Lesson in School Censorship: Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 55 BROOKLYN L. REV. 291, 323 (1989) (emphasis added).
145. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
146. Id. The Hazelwood Court cited the need for educators to account for
the emotional maturity of the intended audience in determining whether particular expression addressing sensitive topics should be permitted in the curricular
forum. Id. at 272. Such sensitive topics might include the existence of Santa
Claus in an elementary school forum or specific information about teenage sexual activity in a high school forum. Id.
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nally, the Hazelwood Court bestowed upon educators the discretion to
regulate expression to ensure that the views of individual speakers are
not wrongfully perceived to bear the imprimatur of the school. 47 Thus,
school officials possess authority to refuse to sponsor speech that might
be perceived, inter alia, to advocate conduct inconsistent with "the
shared values of a civilized social order,"1 4 8 or "to associate the school
with any position other than neutrality on matters of political
49
controversy." 1
Having expressly granted school officials the discretion to undertake regulation of expression in support of the above-listed "legitimate
pedagogical concerns," surely the Court did not then expect or require
that all regulations on expression undertaken by educators in furtherance of these concerns would be strictly viewpoint-neutral. 150 Rather,
147. Id. at 271.
148. Id. at 272 (quoting Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S.
675, 683 (1986)).

149. Id. at 272. One commentator has observed that by allowing school

officials to dissociate the school from any appearance of partisanship, the Hazel-

wood Court attempted "to stifle the very speech that the first amendment seeks

to protect, namely political speech." Note, supra note 144, at 317.
Additionally, the Hazelwood Court outlined several other categories of expression from which school officials have a right to dissociate the school:
(1) speech that is "biased or prejudiced," Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271, and
(2) speech that would "substantially interfere with [the school's] work . . . or
impinge upon the rights of other students." Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969)).
150. In fact, it would be logically indefensible-if not entirely impossiblefor the Court to require that every decision made by educators in pursuit of
these valid objectives must be strictly viewpoint-neutral. For example, the Hazelwood Court granted school officials the discretion to regulate expression to prevent students from being exposed to material that may not be appropriate for
their emotional maturity levels. 484 U.S. at 271-72. The Court noted that such
restrictions might properly involve, for example, protecting elementary school
students from such sensitive topics as the existence of Santa Claus. Id. at 272.
Using the Court's example, it follows that educators will necessarily enjoy discretion to exclude a storyteller who openly denies the existence of Santa Claus
in his or her stories from an elementary school holiday festival, even though
other storytellers who perpetuate the Santa Claus legend may be permitted to
participate in the same festival.
Even more pointedly, the Court granted school officials authority to refuse
to sponsor expression which advocates conduct inconsistent with "the shared
values of a civilized social order." Id. Accordingly, educators may, for example,
refuse to sponsor speech which appears to advocate "irresponsible sex." Id. Invoking such restrictions on expression necessarily involves school officials first
determining whether or not a particular viewpoint-such as the advocacy of irresponsible sex-is consistent with societal values. Upon finding that such a viewpoint is in fact inconsistent, school officials are granted the authority to refuse to
sponsor such expression. Under this framework, school officials would presumably be acting within permissible first amendment bounds by excluding a
speaker whom administrators deem an advocate of irresponsible sex from a high
school roundtable discussion addressing teenage sexuality, while at the same
time permitting speakers who advocate teenage abstinence to serve as panelists
for the same discussion. When school officials seek to determine what, in fact,
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in order to effectuate the clear intent of the Court to allow educators to
pursue these "legitimate pedagogical concerns," the language of Hazelwood must be read to grant educators broad discretion to regulate expression in a curricular setting, even if such regulation is not entirely
viewpoint-neutral. 15 1 Therefore, according to the Hazelwood opinion,
the only limitation imposed upon school officials' pursuit of permissible
objectives is that they must act reasonably when imposing restrictions on
52
expression to achieve these objectives.1
are the so-called "shared values of civilized society," and when they determine
that a particular speaker's viewpoint is inconsistent with those values, and thus,
exclude that speaker from a curricular forum, school officials will be exercising
viewpoint discrimination.
151. The Eleventh Circuit opined that Hazelwood merely authorizes educators to regulate expression based upon content, not viewpoint. Searcey v. Harris,
888 F.2d at 1319 n.7. However, in order to promote the "legitimate pedagogical concerns" outlined in Hazelwood, school officials must engage in both content
and viewpoint selectivity. For example, one valid basis cited by Hazelwood for
regulating expression in a curricular forum is to prevent the erroneous appearance that the views of a particular speaker bear the imprimatur of the school. 484
U.S. at 271. In pursuit of this permissible objective, junior high school officials
might deem it necessary to exclude a speaker from the Nazi Party from participating in a school-wide assembly addressing political parties in the American
political system, despite allowing representatives from the Republican, Democratic and Libertarian parties to freely participate. Although the decision to exclude the Nazi Party would largely be based upon the disagreeable viewpoint of
the speaker, school officials would presumably be justified in excluding such a
speaker not only to avoid the appearance to the students that the school is placing its imprimatur upon the views of the speaker, but also because the speaker's
viewpoint would be decidedly "biased or prejudiced." See id.
Moreover, the Hazewood Court held that educators may regulate the style
and content of expression in a curricular forum provided such restrictions are
"reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." Id. at 273. The Eleventh Circuit in Searcey relied upon this language in concluding that Hazelwood
allows educators to make reasonable content-based restrictions, but not viewpointbased restrictions. 888 F.2d at 1319 n.7. In so reasoning, the Searcey court necessarily concluded that there is a bright line distinguishing content-based restrictions from viewpoint-based restrictions. However, in M.N.C. of Hinesville,
Inc. v. United States Department of Defense, 791 F.2d 1466 (11 th Cir. 1986),
the Eleventh Circuit defined viewpoint-based restrictions as merely a type or
subset of content-based restrictions, rather than as an entirely separate category.
Id. at 1474. The M.N.C. court stated that "content-based restrictions imposed in
nonpublic forums may fall into two categories, those that distinguish between
the views of certain speakers (viewpoint-based) and those that do not (viewpoint-neutral)." Id.; accord, M. REDISH, supra note 3, at 91 ("The classic contentbased regulation is one that prohibits the expression of a particular point of
view."). Thus, under the plain language of the Eleventh Circuit in M.N.C., by
affording educators the discretion to make reasonable content-based restrictions, the Hazelwood Court granted educators the right to make both viewpointbased and viewpoint-neutral restrictions.
152. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273. Moreover, interpreting Hazelwood to require that educators merely act "reasonably" when regulating expression in a
curricular forum is not necessarily inconsistent with the standard established for
a nonpublic forum by the Court in Perry. Perry Educ. Assoc. v. Perry Local Educators' Assoc., 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983). In establishing its constitutional standard

for restrictions on expression in a nonpublic forum, the Perry Court stated that
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Not only does the language of Hazelwood indicate that courts should
not consider viewpoint neutrality when scrutinizing restrictions on expression in a curricular forum,15 3 but in addition, an examination of the
role of the public school in American society suggests that a requirement of viewpoint neutrality is inconsistent with the mission of the public school. American public schools by their very nature are-and
should be-value-laden institutions.1 5 4 Consequently, viewpoint discrimination is inherent in many decisions regulating expression in the
curricular setting. Thus, school officials must sometimes engage in what
would be termed "viewpoint discrimination" under the Perry forum analysis, in order to achieve the desired ends in a curricular setting. 155
"the State may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or
otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to
suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view." Id. at 46
(citing United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453
U.S. 114, 131 n.7 (1981)); accord Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ.
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) ("IT]he government violates the First
Amendment when it denies access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of
view he espouses on an otherwise includible subject."). Such viewpoint discrimination-based upon the improper motivation of the government to suppress a
viewpoint with which it merely disagrees-is per se unconstitutional and would
be unacceptable even under the Hazelwood standard. See Stone, supra note 54, at
227-29.

However, viewpoint discrimination undertaken to further the "legitimate
pedagogical concerns," outlined in Hazelwood, represents a separate species of
viewpoint discrimination which is neither specifically proscribed by the language
of Perry, nor unconstitutional per se. See id. at 229. Rather, when educators restrict expression in a curricular forum in order to further a "legitimate pedagogical concern," such viewpoint discrimination is, by definition, not undertaken
"merely because [school] officials oppose the speaker's view," and would therefore not be proscribed under the plain language of Perry. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
Therefore, Hazelwood can be viewed as consistent with Perry in indicating that the
mere presence of viewpoint discrimination in a restriction on expression in a
curricular forum will not by itself invalidate the restriction, provided that school
officials can establish that the restriction is reasonable and undertaken to further
a "legitimate pedagogical concern" or a "valid educational purpose." Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
153. For a discussion of Hazelwood and the diminished role of viewpoint
neutrality when scrutinizing restrictions on expression in a curricular forum, see
supra notes 135-52 and accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982) ("We have
acknowledged that public schools are vitally important 'in the preparation of
individuals for participation as citizens,' and as vehicles for 'inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system.' ")
(citing Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979)). For a discussion of Pico,
see supra note 132 and accompanying text. See also Diamond, supra note 132, at
499 ("Value inculcation, rather than value neutrality, has been the tradition of
public education since the beginning of the American republic.").
155. For example, an elementary school class might undertake a study of
the Founding Fathers with a stated objective to encourage patriotism and love of
America in students who successfully complete the unit. By its very nature, this
stated objective itself is viewpoint discriminatory because it is based upon the
viewpoint that one should love his or her country. Moreover, to achieve this
stated objective, such a unit requires that students of such a young age must be
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Therefore, regulations on expression in a public school curricular forum
should not be scrutinized under the Peny public forum doctrine, 156 but
instead, they should be subjected to a more deferential standard of reasonableness as was proposed in Hazelwood. 157
C.

Endemic Viewpoint Discriminationand the Need for JudicialDeference in a
Public School CurricularForum

A careful examination of public school policy and operation reveals
that decision-makers frequently and properly engage in "viewpoint discrimination" or "viewpoint selectivity" to achieve the desired pedagogical ends. 158 Consequently, traditional public forum analysis-which
presented with information framed in decidedly pro-American terms. For other
examples of educators engaging in viewpoint discrimination, see infra notes 158,
161 & 165 and accompanying -text. For examples of state education statutes
which mandate the inculcation of such values, see infa note 158.
156. 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).
157. 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
158. See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979). In Norwick, the Court
examined the constitutionality of a New York statute which prevented resident
aliens who refused to become United States citizens from obtaining a teaching
certificate. Id. at 69-70. Although the Court had previously held that classifications based upon alienage were "inherently suspect and subject to close judicial
scrutiny," Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971), the Norwick Court
held that such a high standard did not apply to school teachers. Norwick, 441
U.S. at 80. In reaching this conclusion, the Court considered the role of public
education and the degree of discretion that public school teachers possess, emphasizing the importance of the valueladen role of the teacher and the discretion exercised by the teacher in producing students with the proper value
orientation. Id. at 76-80.
One commentator has observed that "Norwick is essentially a statement by
the Court that public school education is a value-laden activity and that the state
is entitled to ensure that the exemplars chosen for the students have the proper
value orientation." Diamond, supra note 132, at 527. Indeed, one of the central
theses of Diamond's article is the need for judicial deference to the decisions of
educators in areas of first amendment concern to allow school officials to fulfill
the mandates of the public school, including value inculcation. See Diamond,
supra note 132. Implicit in the role of school officials fulfilling these mandates is
the need to make decisions which are necessarily "viewpoint selective."
In fact, many states confer discretion by statute to school officials to engage
in "viewpoint discrimination," or more benignly, "viewpoint selectivity" in seeking to achieve the state's objectives in its public schools. For example, New York
requires that students up to grade eight shall study math, reading, spelling, the
English language, geography, United States history, civics, hygiene, physical education, the history of the State of New York and science. N.Y. EDUC. LAW
§ 3204 (McKinney 1981). However, the statute also enumerates additional state
interests in public education, including the teaching of the destructive effects of
communism, the harmful effects of drugs, and the inculcation of patriotic attitudes. Id. §§ 802, 804, 3204. Similarly, New Jersey requires that high school
students undertake a two-year study of the history of the United States which
shall include the study of events which "will tend to instill.., a determination to
preserve these principles and ideals [of the American form of representative
government] .

.

. and an appreciation of their solemn duty and obligation to

exercise the privilege of the ballot ......

N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 18A:35-2 (West
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expressly forbids any form of viewpoint discrimination-is inappropriate in a public school curricular forum.
First, the public school is by design an institution principally concerned with "nurturing the underlying values of the first amendment." 159 However, because the public school is controlled to a large
extent by both state and local elected officials, society as a whole as well
as the local community ostensibly defines what "underlying values" will
be conveyed and how they should be promoted within the public
school.16 0 Such societal and communal control is evidenced, for example, when school boards or teachers select textbooks forwarding their
own views or biases, or when a teacher is required to submit her or his
weekly lesson plans to the administration for a review of the content and
methodology. 16 1 Such practices, although commonplace, represent a
1987). Moreover, New Jersey affords each local school board the discretion to
develop courses which transmit "the principles of humanity as the same apply to
kindness and avoidance of cruelty to animals and birds, both wild and domesticated." Id. § 18A:35-4.1 (West 1968).
In fact, the Supreme Court has expressed an overall need for increased restrictions on first amendment rights when there is an immature audience that
cannot protect itself from the exercise of expression by others. See, e.g., FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749-50 (1978) (justifying broadcast restrictions
involving indecent language because of media's unique accessibility to children
and state's interest in protecting youth).
159. See Hafen, supra note 79, at 701. Hafen describes public schools as
"first amendment institutions." Id. at 685. According to Hafen, "first amendment institutions" are institutions which can "advance the underlying values of
the first amendment in the lives of individuals." Id. at 685 n.5. Thus, the public
school is "not just another bureaucratic arm of the state, but is an institution
that mediates between the individual and the megastructures of contemporary
government." Id. at 701.
In order to advance the values of the first amendment, however, educators
must interact with students in a manner which is fundamentally different from
any other type of interaction between the state and individuals. Id. In the con-

text of the public school, the state engages in "supervising, directing [and] forbearing, all according to personalized educational judgments about the needs
and circumstances of each child." Id. By engaging in such activities, educators
are seeking to support, rather than to interfere, with first amendment values. Id.
Yet, requiring viewpoint neutrality in all restrictions on expression undertaken
by school officials potentially prevents educators from selectively promoting
these same first amendment values.
The curricular activities of a public school, in particular, bear heavily upon
the values underlying the first amendment. See Diamond, supra note 132, at 497.
Such activities are "concerned with conveying information, assessing the effects
of the conveyance of information, and indoctrinating the participants with the
correct notions about information." Id.
160. Diamond, supra note 132, at 497. "[E]lected representatives of the
state designate the ideology and some of the content of public school teaching
material. The elected representatives of the locality, the local school board, and
their appointees designate the remainder of the content and much of the ideology." Id.
161. Id. Such viewpoint selectivity is also evidenced throughout the school
year when a teacher, after attempting to convey to the students the required
version of a particular subject, tests the students to see if they have learned the
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type of viewpoint discrimination which would be deemed impermissible
162
under the public forum doctrine posited in Perry.
The viewpoint neutrality requirement of the Perry public forum doctrine is also inappropriate for use in scrutinizing restrictions on expression in a public school curricular forum because "one of public
education's principal functions always has been to indoctrinate a genera63
tion of children with the values, traditions, and rituals of society."'
The tradition of the American public education system is value inculcation, not value neutrality. l 4 Judicial affirmation of the public schools'
attempt to inculcate community values is evidenced in cases addressing
16 5
the disciplining or firing of teachers for extracurricular behavior.
material properly. See id. Answers which largely conform to the views taught are
rewarded with high marks, while answers not largely conforming to the expounded views are penalized. Id. "In the end, a sufficient compilation of proper
responses to the controlled process produces a graduate." Id.
162. For a discussion of the Perry forum analysis, see supra notes 35-54 and
accompanying text.
163. Diamond, supra note 132, at 498 (citing R. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN SOCIETY: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 305 (3d ed. 1970)). The Supreme Court

has also noted the role of the public school as an instiller of societal values. See,
e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979) (noting that "[t]he importance
of public schools in the preparation of individuals for participation as citizens,
and in the preservation of the values on which our society rests, long has been
recognized by our decisions"); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493
(1954) (noting that education serves as "a principal instrument in awakening the
child to cultural values"). Interestingly, the role of the public school as a conveyor of societal values was cited by the Searcey court as well. 888 F.2d at 1319.
However, while acknowledging this special function of the public school, the

Searcey court, nonetheless, engaged in a traditional public forum analysis in scrutinizing the Career Day regulations of the Atlanta School Board. Id. at 13181325. For a discussion of the forum analysis employed in Searcey, see supra notes
107-28 and accompanying text.
164. Diamond, supra note 132, at 499 ("[Flrom the beginning, American
education was concerned with the teaching of 'sound doctrine' by teachers, locally selected and controlled, who were 'sound in faith.' ").
165. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Meade Indep. School Dist., 530 F.2d 799 (8th Cir.

1976); Cook v. Hudson, 511 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1975); Miller v. School Dist.
Number 167, 495 F.2d 658 (7th Cir. 1974). Typically, the teacher is not engaging in illegal behavior, but rather simply behavior which is contrary to the values
which the school system seeks to promote. Diamond, supra note 132, at 505
n.129. Diamond cites three cases in support of this proposition. Id. First, in
Sullivan v. Meade Independent School District, the Eighth Circuit upheld the

firing of a single female school teacher because she was living with a man. 530
F.2d at 804-08. The court noted that the school teacher's conduct might have a

negative effect on her students, especially in light of the fact that she taught in a
small rural community, and therefore, her termination was justified. Id. at 808.
Similarly, in Cook v. Hudson, the Fifth Circuit held that a school district was
entitled to require that all members of its faculty must be committed to a desegregated school system. 511 F.2d at 748. Therefore, the school was justified in
not rehiring a teacher who sent his children to a private, segregated school in
direct violation of a school board rule forbidding such practice by members of
the faculty. Id. at 744-46, 749. Finally, in Miller v. School District Number 167,
the Seventh Circuit held that a school board, elected by the local community,
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Such attempts at value inculcation plainly contradict the viewpoint-neutral requirements imposed under a traditional forum analysis.
A third and compelling reason for excluding the viewpoint neutral
requirement in analyzing restrictions on expression in a public school is
that by allowing "managerial authority over speech," the school's primary goal of education is furthered. ' 6 6 Courts have long recognized the
need for restrictions on expression in order to achieve the legitimate
goals of many different types of institutions including prisons,' 67 military bases, 1 68 the judicial system' 69 and public schools where student
speech is involved.' 70 Thus, while viewpoint discrimination, prior remay select teachers on the basis of their view of the type of person who should
associate with their children. 495 F.2d at 667.
166. Post, supra note 10, at 1769. Although Post refers specifically to employees or members of an institution, there is little reason to draw any distinction between restrictions imposed upon a teacher or a janitor employed by a
public school or an outside speaker invited into the school by the administration. To argue otherwise would lead to the situation where although a teacher
might be restrained from presenting a certain viewpoint to her or his class, that
same teacher could simply invite an outside speaker to present the same restricted material.
167. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) ("(W]hen a prison
regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it
is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."). Post notes that even
though prisoners do not enter confinement voluntarily, the Court has explicitly
subordinated the first amendment rights of prisoners in order for prison officials
to attain "the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system." Post,
supra note 10, at 1770 (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974)).
168. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) ("Our review of military regulations challenged on First Amendment grounds is far more
deferential than constitutional review of similar laws or regulations designed for
civilian life."). Regarding free speech in the military, the Court stated in Brown
v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354 (1980), that "[s]peech likely to interfere with...
vital prerequisites for military effectiveness ...

can be excluded from a military

base." Post, supra note 10, at 1770.
169. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984). The Supreme
Court in Rhinehart held "that the fair and expeditious administration of the judicial system justifies subjecting the pretrial speech of litigants to prior restraints
at the discretion of a trialjudge." Post, supra note 10, at 1771. It is noteworthy
that this "judicial authority extends equally to plaintiffs, who have voluntarily submitted to a court's jurisdiction, and to defendants, who have not." Id. (emphasis
added). The judge's control of speech within the courtroom is even more extensive, and extends indifferently to parties, witnesses and even spectators. Id. at
1771 n.228.
170. See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
For a discussion of Hazelwood, see supra notes 73-84 and accompanying text. See
also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
Post observes that even though elementary and secondary students are compelled to attend school, the Supreme Court has held "that student speech, 'in
class or out of it, which for any reason-whether it stems from time, place, or
type of behavior-materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder
or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.'" Post, supra note 10, at 1770 (quoting
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513).
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straints, official discretion, agenda setting and so forth are presumptively unconstitutional when the state seeks to govern the speech of the
general public, these principles do not automatically apply when the
71
government regulates speech within the institutions it manages.'
Rather, once it is established that the government may properly exercise
managerial authority over the resource at issue, the sole question for
judicial determination should be whether a regulation on speech is
"necessary for the achievement of... legitimate institutional ends."' 72
Thus, in light of the undisputable need for public officials and educators
to exercise managerial authority over the curricular environment of a
public school, the sole issue before the court when scrutinizing a restriction on expression in a curricular setting should be whether the restriction is "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."' 7 3
Unavoidably, there will be instances in which it will be necessary for a
school official or a teacher to regulate expression based, at least par174
If
tially, on viewpoint in order to achieve valid pedagogical goals.
such decisions were scrutinized according to the public forum rubric established in Perry, however, a court would be compelled to find that such
restrictions
were
viewpoint
discriminatory,
and
therefore,
75

unsustainable. 1

A fourth and final rationale for not employing traditional public forum analysis when scrutinizing restrictions on expression in a public
school is the Court-acknowledged need for deference to the decisions of
educators concerning curricular issues. 176 This deference to the judg171. Post, supra note 10, at 1782.

172. Id. at 1783.
173. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273. For a discussion of the Hazelwood standard,

see supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
174. Indeed, the facts of Hazelwood are illustrative of a situation in which an
educator was justified in regulating expression based-at least partially-on the
content and viewpoint of student speech. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). For a
discussion of Hazelwood, see supra notes 73-84 and accompanying text.
175. For a discussion of the Perry public forum doctrine, see supra notes 3554 and accompanying text. Under the public forum analysis proposed in Perry,
any restrictions on expression-whether in a public or nonpublic forum-must
be viewpoint-neutral. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46. Therefore, when a science
teacher elects to teach only one theory to explain a phenomenon, despite the
availability of numerous accepted approaches, that teacher is necessarily favoring one viewpoint over another and technically engaging in forbidden viewpoint
discrimination. Similarly, when a school board selects a history textbook partially based upon the author's pro-American treatment of the events surrounding World War II, the board is engaging in viewpoint discrimination. This
author suggests that under a traditional public forum analysis, both the science
teacher's and the school board's decisions would constitute impermissible viewpoint discrimination-despite the presence of a reasonable basis for both decisions-and would therefore be unsustainable. Under the Hazelwood standard of
reasonableness, however both the science teacher's and the school board's decisions would be sustainable, provided only that the decisions were "reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
176. See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273
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ment of educators is necessary because "in the public school context,
perhaps no one, but certainly not the judiciary, can readily ascertain the
mental or emotional state that is necessary, appropriate, or desirable for
learning to take place."' 77 Employing the Hazelwood reasonableness
standard in scrutinizing restrictions on expression in a public school
would vest educational decision-makers with the appropriate latitude to
make decisions affecting the curricular environment. 178 Conversely, a
requirement that all restrictions on expression imposed by educators
must be viewpoint-neutral has three deleterious effects: (1) it forecloses
a large area of discretion to the public school decision-maker who is
faced with limited time and resources; 179 (2) it invites increased litigation as educators seek to contend with an increasingly pluralistic society' 80 and (3) it denies the social realities and structure of the American
public school system which is commissioned to inculcate values as well
8
as to impart knowledge.' '
(1988) ("[Tlhe education of the Nation's youth is primarily the responsibility of
parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of federal
judges."); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
507 (1969) ("[T]he Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the
comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with
fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the
schools.").
177. Diamond, supra note 132, at 486. The difficulty of ascertaining the
circumstances and conditions necessary for learning is aptly illustrated by the
circumstances surrounding the issuance of the Coleman Report in 1965. Id. at
486 n.51. The Coleman Report was touted as a comprehensive analysis of education and suggested that "the social class composition of public schools is the
most important variable affecting learning." Id. Therefore, the Report recommended that "lower income blacks should be integrated in classes with middleincome white students." Id. This report was widely criticized on a number of
bases, including its methodology and its basic assumptions. Id. For an example
of criticism of the Coleman Report, see Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A
Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CALI!. L. REV. 275, 403-37 (1972). In
1981, Professor Coleman issued a second report which "suggested that everyone, regardless of race or social class, learns better in private and parochial
schools than in public schools." Diamond, supra note 132, at 486 n.51. Diamond writes that "[t]he changed viewpoint of the later Coleman Report reflects
the tremendous empirical uncertainty over what constitutes the best, or even an
adequate, learning environment." Id.
178. For a discussion of the Hazelwood reasonableness standard, see supra
notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
179. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981) (recognizing right of
state university to "make academic judgments as to how best to allocate scarce
resources").
180. See, e.g., Note, Seen But Not Heard. In What Forum May High School Students Exercise First Amendment Rights After Hazelwood?, 25 WILLAMErrE L. REV.
197, 214 (1989) ("[p]otentially, the deferential standard could result in a decline

in the number of student first amendment claims filed"); Komesar, A Jobfor the
Judges: The Judiciary and the Constitution in a Massive and Complex Society, 86 MicH. L.
REV. 657, 692-95 (1988) (suggesting that lower level of judicial scrutiny is one

method of dealing with burgeoning constitutional claims).
181. For a discussion of the inculcation of values in the public school, see
supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
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D. The Application of the Hazelwood Reasonableness Standard
to Searcey v. Harris

The Searcey court relied upon the Perry public forum doctrine in assessing the various access restrictions imposed by the School Board on
the APA. 182 This assessment required the court to determine whether
the Board's Career Day access policy was both "reasonable" and "view83
point-neutral."'
Curiously, the court in Searcey appeared to apply the same "reasonableness" standard suggested by Hazelwood in assessing the validity of the
Career Day regulations.' 8 4 In fact, the Searcey court acknowledged that
because Career Day was a nonpublic forum, the School Board would be
acting reasonably if the regulations placed on Career Day made "content-based distinctions which serve an educational purpose."' 8 5 This
standard is functionally identical to the "reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns" standard established in Hazelwood for assessing
the reasonableness of a restriction on expression in a curricular
setting. 1

86

Following its testing of the reasonableness of the Career Day regulations, however, the court in Searcey imposed a viewpoint neutrality test
as is required when analyzing restrictions on expressions in a nonpublic
forum. 18 7 Under the more appropriate standard of Hazelwood, rather

182. For a discussion of the public forum analysis employed in Searcey, see
supra notes 115-23 and accompanying text.
183. Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d at 1319.
184. Id. The Hazelwood court defined "reasonableness" in terms of whether
a restriction was "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." 484
U.S. at 273. The court in Searcey relied upon Cornelius for its definition and stated
that "the Cornelius standard requires that the regulations be reasonable in light
of the pedagogical purposes of the particular activity." Searcey v. Harris, 888
F.2d at 1319.
185. Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d at 1321.
186. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273. Not surprisingly, the court in Searcey concluded that the reasonableness standards in Hazelwood and Cornelius were indistinguishable for purposes of its analysis of the School Board's Career Day
regulations. Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d at 1319.
187. Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d at 1324-25. The Searcey court noted that
"as with any other nonpublic forum, once the School Board determines that
certain speech is appropriate for its students, it may not discriminate between
speakers who will speak on the topic merely because it disagrees with their
views." Id. at 1324.
The court cited an opinion of the Ninth Circuit as an example of school
authorities opening a forum [a school newspaper] for discussion of the military
and then-merely because the school disagreed with the group's viewpointrefusing access to a peace group who sought to address the same topic. Searcey
v. Harris, 888 F.2d at 1324. In San Diego Committee, the Ninth Circuit employed
public forum analysis and determined that the exclusion of the peace group's
advertising from the school newspaper was viewpoint discriminatory, and therefore, unconstitutional. San Diego Comm. Against Registration and the Draft v.
Governing of Grossmont Union School Dist., 790 F.2d 1471, 1481 (9th Cir.
1986). Although decided prior to Hazelwood, San Diego Committee represents an-
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than employing a second test and requiring that the Career Day regulations be viewpoint-neutral, the Searcey court should have simply stopped
its analysis of the Career Day regulations after applying the reasonableness test. If the Board was unable to demonstrate that a particular regulation was "reasonably related to [a] legitimate pedagogical
concern,"' 8 8 the regulation would have been unsustainable. However,
if the Board could establish that a regulation bore upon a "legitimate
pedagogical concern" or furthered a "valid educational purpose" surrounding Career Day, the regulation would be sustainable, even if the
regulation clearly discriminated against the viewpoint of the APA, or any
other group or individual.' 8 9 In essence, under the Hazelwood standard,
the test for restrictions on expression in a curricular forum is streamlined to one simple standard. 190
Not surprisingly, had the Searcey court employed the Hazelwood standard rather than a traditional public forum analysis in assessing the constitutionality of the Career Day regulations, it is likely that the court
would have reached a different conclusion. 19 1 The Eleventh Circuit in
Searcey determined that the regulation which excluded all speakers
whose "primary focus or emphasis to discourage a student's participation in a particular career field" was unreasonable as it totally excluded
such persons or groups from Career Day, rather than simply limiting
what the group might discuss at the forum. 192 The court reached this
other situation in which the basic standard of reasonableness is more appropriate than the traditional public forum rubric in analyzing a restriction on
expression in a curricular setting such as a school newspaper. If the administrator is unable to demonstrate an underlying "legitimate pedagogical concern" in
his exclusion of the peace group's advertising, then the administrator's action
would be unsustainable. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273. However, even if, in
fact, the administrator's rationale for excluding the peace group was largely
viewpoint-based, such a restriction would still be sustainable under the Hazelwood standard if the administrator could demonstrate the "reasonableness" of
the exclusion. Therein lies the important distinction between the application of
the public forum doctrine with its traditionally strict requirement of viewpoint
neutrality and the application of the more deferential Hazelwood standard of reasonableness to a curricular setting.
188. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
189. Id.
190. Specifically, the test under Hazelwood is simply whether a restriction on
expression is "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." Id.
191. For a discussion of the Career Day Regulations, see supra note 106.
For a discussion of the Hazelwood reasonableness standard, see supra notes 78-84
and accompanying text.
192. Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d at 1322. Additionally, the court in Searcey
determined that the portion of the regulations requiring that participants have
"some present affiliation with that career field" was unreasonable because it
would necessarily preclude even recent retirees from participating in Career
Day. Id. at 1321. The court reached this conclusion despite noting that the purposes underlying the "present affiliation" requirement-to ensure that "a presenter knows what he is talking about" and to avoid political debate at Career
Day-were in fact "legitimate pedagogical concerns." Id. at 1320-21. Thus, the
Searcey court invalidated the "present affiliation" requirement based upon its de-
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conclusion despite acknowledging that motivating students and "exclud[ing] discussion of controversial matters from Career Day" were
valid educational objectives.' 93 Essentially, the Searcey court reasoned
that, although the total exclusion of speakers who sought primarily to
discourage students would further these legitimate objectives, the availability of a less restrictive alternative made the regulation
unreasonable. 194
Under the deferential approach of Hazelwood, however, it is unlikely
that this regulation would have been invalidated.1 9 5 Rather, in light of
the need for deference to the decisions of educators acknowledged in
Hazelwood, the Searcey court would have upheld the regulation once it
determined that, in fact, the total exclusion of the speakers would further the legitimate pedagogical objectives of motivating students and
"exclud[ing] discussion of controversial matters from Career Day."1 96
The fact that the Searcey court was able to propose less restrictive means
to further these valid objectives-namely limiting what a group can say
rather than total exclusion-would not make the original regulation unreasonable.19 7 Thus, applying the Hazelwood reasonableness standard,
the Searcey court would have sustained the regulation which excluded
termination that such a requirement was not a reasonable means of achieving
the stated "legitimate pedagogical concerns." Id. at 1321-22.
Even under the deferential approach of Hazelwood, however, it is likely that
the "present affiliation" requirement would fiave been invalidated. The School
Board failed to introduce any evidence into the record to indicate how this requirement would in any way further the legitimate concerns underlying the regulation. Id. at 1322. Absent any justification on the record, the Searcey court

would be unable to conclude that the "present affiliation" requirement was reasonable, even under the deferential standard of Hazelwood. See id. (citing Hazel-

wood, 484 U.S. at 275 & n.8).
193. See id. at 1322-23.

194. Id. at 1322. The court stated that "[ilt is the total banning of a group
from the forum-rather than limiting what a group can say-that we find to be
unreasonable." Id.
195. For a discussion of the deferential approach of Hazelwood, see supra
notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
196. See Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d at 1322-23. Indeed, the Searcey court
found that the regulation prohibiting a group whose sole purpose is to discourage students from a particular career field was reasonable. Id. at 1322.
Earlier, the district court had determined that the regulation which prohibited the participation of persons whose primary focus was to discourage students
from a particular field was reasonable. Id. However, the district court invalidated the regulation after concluding that it was promulgated to suppress the
viewpoint of the APA. Id.
Under the Hazelwood standard, the district court would not have engaged in
a separate viewpoint neutrality analysis to invalidate the regulation. Rather, the
district court would have sustained the regulation once it had determined that
the regulation was reasonable and furthered legitimate pedagogical concerns.
197. In fact, the government argued in Searcey that in order to be sustained,
a regulation "need only be reasonable; it need not be the most reasonable or the
only reasonable limitation." Id. at 1321 (emphasis added) (quoting Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 808 (1985)).
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participants whose primary emphasis was to discourage students from
pursuing one particular career field.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The public forum doctrine has proven to be effective in assessing
the constitutionality of restrictions on expression in most governmentcontrolled forums. A public school, however, represents a unique forum in light of the special mission that society has delegated to the public school system. Continued application of the public forum doctrine in
scrutinizing restrictions on expression in the public schools fails to adequately consider the special features of the public school and will inevitably hinder the necessary discretion vested in educational decisionmakers. Consequently, rather than applying the public forum doctrine
to Career Day in Atlanta's public schools, the Eleventh Circuit should
have employed the reasonableness standard posited in Hazelwood. Such
a standard more fully addresses the unique mission of the American
public school system and the special status which the courts have historically granted to that system.
Brian S. Black
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